

GERMANY

11/2/45  
**SECRET**

Attached are three memoranda  
 prepared by your suggestion out-  
 lined in the plan for being pre-  
 sented or presently in operation  
 for the liberation of Germany  
 and the rest of Europe.

In connection with the memo  
 from Mr. Ferdinand  
 the second is to point out  
 that it should be considered as  
 a general outline only and that  
 the various points covered there-  
 in will have to be worked out  
 in much greater detail.  
 The third is a more  
 complete description of any of  
 the measures described in these  
 memoranda. It is the hope that repre-  
 sentatives of the branches will  
 be able to provide such infor-  
 mation as may be needed.

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**SECRET**

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Germany 13,044

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan

2 November, 1943

FROM: The Secretariat

SUBJECT: SO Plans for Penetration of Germany.

In the course of a conversation with Major Sharp on the subject of SO plans for the penetration of Germany, he stated that present efforts of SO are directed along three lines:

1. Recruiting the classical type of SO operative in an effort to build up a pool of German SO agents. At the present time Major Sharp has 38 potential candidates with 24 additional men in prospect.
2. Investigation and consideration of what Major Sharp describes as "spontaneous" plans suggested to SO from sources both inside and outside the organization.
3. Development of a plan to use small combat teams in conjunction with D day operations. Screening of Germans in concentration camps has been undertaken as a means of obtaining anti-Nazi German speaking recruits for this plan.

In a joint operation with the British, SO is about to undertake a project in Sweden, one of the objectives of which will be to set up a line of communications into Germany.

Sometime ago it was suggested to London that an effort should be made to use French labor drafted for services in Germany to carry out sabotage activities. Major Sharp does not know whether SO London ever followed through on this suggestion.

A.W.S.

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LIST OF CONTACTS FOR PENETRATIONII. SWEDENStockholm

1. Contact with British agents.
2. Contact with foreign government officials friendly to us, including at least two Italians, a number of Poles, Swedes, Danes and Norwegians; and one Bulgarian.
3. Contact with labor groups including seamen and railway workers. These contacts furnish substantial information on German rail transit through Sweden; German shipping in the Baltic and to and from Norway; and installations and shipping in northern German ports.
4. Contact with war escapees from enemy and enemy-occupied territories, chiefly agents of various nationalities from German Baltic ships, Norwegians and Danes of all sorts, Baltic, escaping prisoners of war, etc.
5. Contact with pre-war political refugees, such as former Social Democratic leaders.
6. Contact with travellers such as Government officials, businessmen, engineers, journalists, and various other professional people travelling between Sweden and Germany and other parts of the Continent. These sources provide a good deal of information on Germany; such as reports on bank damage, morals, industrial production, etc.

Gothenburg

The Stockholm Office has recently advised that positive penetration of Gothenburg is now a fact - presumably from Sweden. No details as yet.

Malmo

German former labor leader (SS-4).

Berlin

1. Establishment of Hungarian Secret Intelligence Unit composed of Hungarian nationals, under direction of Bureau, with the following purposes:

- a. Order of battle with special emphasis at start

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

on covering the "Danube Line" for military traffic.

b. To establish a network for the penetration of Germany itself.

c. Top-drawer contacts inside Germany.

2. Information obtained daily by radio telephone from Berno.
3. Labor contacts.
4. FBI reports.

#### **Intelligence**

1. According to a cable from Cairo, an independent group for penetration into the Reich is set up and has started to achieve results. Cable went to inquire into particulars.
2. A chain is also being built up to do similar work through Chinese sources.

#### **Intelligence**

1. "Merchant" system for work with Danish Jewish refugees, etc.

#### **Intelligence**

1. Trump.
2. Kelly's French groups.
3. "Scripture" plan.
4. "Junk" plan.

#### **Intelligence**

1. Setting up contacts within the Reich through development of relations in Italy with Italian industrialists and bankers in neutral territory, or with Italian diplomatic and consular officers.
2. "Point" plan

#### **Intelligence**

SECRET

1. Polish Intelligence.
2. Follow-up of the interview.

#### **Intelligence**

Date 25 October 1943

To: A. W. Sulloway

Remarks:

Attached is the dope you wanted on the  
Penetration of Germany. I hope it fills the  
bill. If it doesn't, give me a shout.



Patrick Dolan  
1st Lt. Aus

SECRET

MC BRANCH

Date October 18, 1943To: Lt. Dolan

Remarks:

This outline of M.O.'s plans for the penetration of Germany conforms as nearly as possible to Sullaway's instructions which were: stick to the actual penetration of Germany itself, be brief, don't go into detail regarding M.O. functions and the M.O. set up in general.

Edward *E. Cushing*

147031

NO BRANCH

2

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Date Rec'd SA .....

No.	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Month	Day		
1	101				
2	102				
3	103				
4	104				
5	105				
6	106				
7	107				
8	108				
9	109				
10	110				

1. All information should be furnished to correspond with number in To column.  
2. All information should be furnished to correspond with number in To column.  
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# REPORT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

October 18, 1943

To: Lt. Patrick Dolan  
From: Edward Cushing PC  
Subject: M.O. Penetration of Germany

M.O. Branch operations against Germany may be classified as follows:

- (1) Operations Before D Day
  - (a) In Germany Itself
  - (b) In the vassal states
- (2) Operations on and after D Day
  - (a) In Germany Itself
  - (b) In the vassal states

This memorandum is concerned with (1). Operations under (2) will presumably be similar to PW operations, in which M.O. participated in the Mediterranean area during the North African and Sicilian campaigns. For such operations in other areas - Western Europe and the Balkans, for example - M.O. will be called upon to supply properly qualified personnel for PW combat teams working with the armed forces. M.O. is now engaged in recruiting this personnel.

The general objectives of M.O. under (1) are by means of rumor, black radio, black printing, forged documents, bribery and corruption, the use of agents, etc., etc., to (a) stimulate and organize resistance to the Nazi Government in Germany; (b) foster political dissension in Germany; (c) discredit the Nazi leadership; (d) demoralize the civilian population of Germany; (e) demoralize Germany's armed forces.

To arrive at these objectives, it will be necessary sooner or later (and sooner rather than later) to open lines of communication and supply into Germany, over which first intelligence and then material and men can travel. Here is how M.O. proposes to do this:

**SECRET**

Lt. Patrick Moran

-3-

October 18, 1943

(1) M.O. will work in collaboration with the British in an attempt to penetrate Germany via underground movements in France, Belgium, Holland, and by utilizing the labor draft which Germany has imposed on those countries. At the urgent request of Rae Smith, MO's London representative, MO is here engaging in a recruiting program designed to supply the MO-PWE-SOR combine with ~~properly~~ properly qualified agents to be introduced into Germany and German held territory for operations before D Day.

(2) M.O. is sending a mission of 6 - 10 men to Stockholm. The duties of this all-important mission, key men for which have been selected and trained, will be to establish communications with Germany, to devise means of introducing agents and supplies into Germany, and to set up black radio facilities either on German, German occupied or neutral territory.

(3) M.O. is sending a mission of 2 men to Lisbon, Portugal. This mission will engage in rumor mongering, will establish a mail drop for infiltration of prison pen letters, forged documents and other subversive written material into Germany, and will attempt to recruit sub-agents among German nationals in Portugal.

(4) The possibility of sending a similar mission to Spain is now being explored by M.O.

(5) In Bern for the present M.O. must rely on the cooperation of G.S.S. representatives already on the scene, since it is not possible at this time to send agents into Switzerland. Assistance has been promised in the matter of introducing subversive printed matter into Germany from the Swiss base. Subject to the outcome of military operations now under way in Italy, it should be possible at a later time to use Switzerland as a base for the infiltration of agents into Germany.

(6) The above holds equally true in the case of northern Italy, which, should it fall to us, would be used as a base for infiltrating agents and supplies into southern Germany (Austria).

The use of M.O. bases in other theaters for operations against Germany proper is also feasible. This is especially true of the Middle East base, whence direct contact can be made, via Turkey, with Germans residing or travelling in the Levant. Further, M.O. operations in the Middle East and North African theaters are and will continue to be coordinated with operations in London in the effort to penetrate Germany with rumors (by means of agent contacts and black radio) and subversive printed material.

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**SECRET**

28 October 1943

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:**

The following comes from one of our men in Stockholm:

"According to evidence which is considered reliable, there is now in the process of being organized in Stockholm a Free German Committee which is patterned after the Committee that was organized in Moscow. (Please refer to the Legation's Telegram No. 2622 August 20th of this year). Communists, Social Democrats and the leading Refugee Trade Unionists from Germany have been holding conferences during the past fortnight. An invitation was tendered to the Social Democrats to join the Committee which the Communists in Stockholm are undertaking to organize, but this invitation was declined by the representatives of the Social Democrats.

✓ "The Social Democratic Representatives have been informed by the Communists that a Committee such as the one mentioned above is being organized, and that representation has been obtained from refugee Germans at the University of Uppsala. According to reports, there have been persons with Communist sympathies among the German refugees at Uppsala.

"It is further claimed by the Communists that the Community of the German Church in Stockholm has provided representation. These persons are understood to have conservative leanings and have not been politically inclined but have demonstrated their feeling against the Nazis by desisting to respond to notices to perform service in the armies of Germany.

Encl. 3434 - Fin. Stockholm - 10/20/43

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

-2-

"An active part in the organization of the Committee is being taken by the Swedish Communist party. The person from whom the legation obtained this information is of the belief that the Communists among the German refugees have been in communication with the Committee at Moscow and that the Swedish Communists were the medium through which such communication was established. There is no concrete evidence to support this, however.

"When a meeting takes place this week, the refugee group of the Social Democrats will delegate some person to attend it in the capacity of an observer.

"It is indicated in a report of the meetings which took place between the refugee Social Democrats and the refugee German Communists that the following argument is being used for the association of the Moscow Committee with the German military representatives.

"The object of this association is to endeavor to penetrate the military groups of the Germans. That is to say: That the Communists expect to expedite the collapse of East Germany by means of appeals from territory which has been captured from Germany."

William J. Donovan  
Director

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October 13, 1943

**MEMORANDUM FOR DR. LANGER:**

Shepard Morgan asked me to press you for an answer to the two questions:

1. What is your best estimate of the German fighter airplane strength in the ETO on November 1, 1943?
2. The same information for March 1, 1944.

He said also that he needs a definite clarification from General Hildring of our function with respect to CAD in London. He is anxious to get the 16 people he has asked for over there as soon as possible. He tells me that he is recruiting two and possibly more men already in the ETO for service in that area with RMA.

W. J. D.

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DUNN

✓ *Troute*  
 ✓ *European*  
 ✓ *...*

Three points on which your stimulation may be most valuable:

1. Up to the present, G-2, Stouss, has been a safe deposit institution for voluminous material provided by this office, but has been a very poor customer. We are now engaged, at the instigation of an officer immediately representing the Commanding General, on a co-operative undertaking. At his request, we have provided him with assistance in the preliminary stage. What we do in actual practice now, may well be the test for the place R & A holds in this theatre for the future.

I cabled Bill Menger, triple priority, last Tuesday afternoon, asking help on a specific job, materials for which I know are in current process in R & A, Washington. I asked for a reasoned answer up to a thousand words, to be available to us in London on or before October 8th, to the following questions:

- a) What is your best estimate of the German fighter airplane strength in the ETO on November 1, 1943?
- b) The same information for March 1, 1944.

These dates are specimen dates only, but an answer would be extremely informative nevertheless.

I did not say in my telegram specifically what the information was wanted for, since I did not want it put on the cable. I did, however, ask Bill to take my word for it that a competent answer available to us on October 8th, would be regarded in the highest American quarters as conclusive evidence of our value in this theatre. I added that I had great faith that the job could be done through Mr. Menger, Morse and Kindleberger.

In the meantime, our two members of the group working with G-2, have assembled all pertinent information available to R & A, London. Up to the present (noon on Thursday), I have had no response to my cable, saying whether or not the job is possible.

We are pretty well set in a preliminary way to do a job in the higher stratum of Civil Affairs of which the head is General Hilliering at CAD in Washington. As you know, Holborn has established a first rate relationship in Washington with General Hilliering and CAD, and Winston Armstrong of R & A, Washington, has arrived in London and has already taken his seat off. The head of CAD here is Colonel Ryan with whom we are on excellent terms and who is looking to us to play a considerable part. Our position, however, remains unclarified because General Hilliering has not yet cabled to Colonel Ryan that

-2-

he may look to us for help. General Hillaring gave Armstrong a letter of introduction to Colonel Ryan which Armstrong delivered with marked success. I believe the telegram awaits the dispatch of a letter by General Hillaring to you establishing our association with this work.

You know, of course, that four of our men are already working with P&A on the production of basic handbooks on civil affairs, and the two-way flow of finished products between London and Washington is working pretty well, though we got off to a slow start. While this work is purely factual, providing the incident of information for future Civil Affairs administrators, nevertheless it is really the foundation for the big house which General Hillaring is charged with constructing. But the two things fit and as the basic handbook job tapers off, I should hope to put the men to work on the upper stories of the structure for which General Hillaring is responsible.

What we need is the definite clarification by General Hillaring of our function with respect to it in London.

We have received word from time to time from Washington that there are sixteen persons including two or three civilians, who are scheduled for arrival here between now and the end of December. We need them all as promptly as possible. Yesterday, taking advantage of the thaw of the transportation ice-jam, I cabled to inquire whether eight scheduled for arrival in September and October are ready. In that case, I said we were prepared to ask for first or second air priorities and expected to get them. These people, in their various capacities, are needed in connection with the expansion of our work for C-2, Civil Affairs, and otherwise. I would appreciate a push from you, to get not simply the eight, but the sixteen over here as promptly as possible. In the meantime, I am recruiting two and possibly more men already in this theatre for service with P & A.

*Shepard Morgan*

Shepard Morgan.  
Director, Research & Analysis Branch, G-2,  
London.

SECRET  
August 13, 1943

## THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE ENUNCIATION OF ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR AIMS

The Free Germany Manifesto issued in Moscow has put the spotlight on the problem of United Nations war aims as they affect Germany. While it represents unilateral action by Russia without previous consultation with the Anglo-Americans, we should be able to exploit it in our psychological warfare program. This can be accomplished most effectively by an early declaration of war aims in respect to Germany.

Favorable military developments make this moment particularly suitable for an enunciation of the purposes of the United Nations in the reconstruction of Europe. In both Axis and satellite states attention is riveted upon the specific intentions of the United Nations in respect to them. A statement of these intentions as they affect Germany can therefore very properly be woven into the framework of a broader declaration which would avoid the appearance of either a reply to, or an echo of, the Moscow Manifesto.

### Appeal of the Free Germany Manifesto to the German People

To the average German the strongest attraction of the Free Germany Manifesto lies in the reassurance it offers in respect to the fears that have been carefully fostered by the Nazis. The "victory or annihilation" formula continually reiterated by Goebbels has proved remarkably effective. The Manifesto, however, counters this by a promise to maintain Germany both as a nation and a great power. In addition, the Germans are assured of liberation from the Nazi yoke and the return of the liberties of the Weimar Constitution. In many respects the average German is thus invited to share in the United Nations victory.

The chief weakness to the appeal of the Manifesto lies not within

SECRET

-2-

its contents, which represents a masterly composition, but in the character of its sponsors. The endorsement by the Communist Party rather than by the Soviet government <sup>provides</sup> /room for the suspicion that it could be repudiated whenever convenient. There will be the further suspicion in Germany that the Manifesto, even if implemented, would merely serve as a wedge for the establishment of a Communist regime or for making Germany a satellite of the Soviet Union.

This attitude of doubt and misgiving is certain to be most pronounced in the followings of the old republican parties, notably the Social Democrats and the Catholic center. Both these groups would express the reaction of the average German in being far more disposed to welcome Anglo-American participation in the reconstruction of Germany. Prisoner-of-war interrogations have demonstrated this with monotonous regularity. The German people have been enormously impressed by the illustration of working wartime democracy which they have witnessed in Britain.

While the Communist Party probably has the tightest and most fully indoctrinated following among opposition elements in Germany, the mass support for Social Democratic or Catholic tendencies on the German home front is proportionately greater than ever before. This can be demonstrated statistically by a breakdown of the German working population according to age groups. In the last years of the Weimar Republic both these parties drew a large portion of their support from persons over 30 years of age (in the case of the Social Democrats over 80%), while the youth tended to flock to the Nazis or Communists. It follows that with the men between 20 and 40 mostly on the firing line, the vast majority of workers today fall into the groups which were once the backbone of liberal Germany. The importance of this situation lies in the fact that as in 1918 (and in Russia in 1917) any break that may occur is likely to



SECRET

-3-

originate on the home front, which represents the best target for our psychological warfare.

In spite of this strong inclination to follow the lead of Britain and the United States, these forces might turn to Russia if no constructive democratic program were forthcoming from the West or if the fear of Sovietism were subordinated to the desire to remain an independent nation. The need for an early pronouncement by the Anglo-Americans is therefore pressing. A declaration formulated in common with the Soviet Union, though most desirable, would only be conceivable in the framework of a larger understanding with Stalin, such as at this moment is not in sight. Time being of the essence, nothing remains but to issue such a declaration as would not clash visibly with that originating in Moscow and the impulse for which would appear to arise from recent events in the Mediterranean.

Nature of an Anglo-American Declaration of War Aims Affecting Germany

An Anglo-American declaration of war aims affecting Germany should harmonize with the Free Germany Manifesto as much as possible so as to preserve an appearance of fundamental solidarity among the United Nations and maintain a path for a later understanding with Russia. It should also be introduced by a statement that it is meant to interpret and amplify earlier pronouncements of Allied spokesmen.

1. The German people should be invited to cast off the Nazi regime and thus become participants in the victory of the United Nations over Nazism.
2. There should be renewed emphasis on differentiation between the German people and those responsible for the abuses of the Nazi regime.
3. Germany should be assured that Britain and the United States have



SECRET

-4-

- no desire to destroy her unity.
4. Any occupation of German territory could be declared to be limited to the period required to complete the extirpation of National Socialism.
  5. Through the extirpation of National Socialism the German people would be freed to form a democratic government of their own choice.
  6. In accordance with statements by Prime Minister Churchill, the German people could be assured of opportunities for economic development. There will be no discrimination against any nation in respect to access to markets or raw materials.
  7. Germany should be assured equality in any new European (or world) federation that might be formed after the war.

*Prepared in the Quebec Conference  
by Mr. G. Robinson & Mr. Mason*

*Mr. [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]*  
*Mr. [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]*  
Infiltration While Germany Is Cracking Up

In the very initial phase of surrender messages of a more "personal" character should be added to the present routine of Political Warfare which seems to consist of news about the war, reports about the U.S.A. and its war effort and denunciations of the Nazi regime.

The "moral" position of the "decent" German should be discussed from his viewpoint. Many Germans realize with growing shame that the Nazi regime has brought Germany into general disrepute through its conduct in the war. Individuals everywhere in Germany are coming to doubt whether they are not themselves guilty for not resisting the Nazi regime in time. Many Germans are only now beginning to form a clear picture of what has happened since 1933 and to realize that their passivity or subservience contributed to it. They would be impressed and their doubts confirmed if they felt their position was understood over here. This would help them to make up their minds to oppose the Nazis.

The messages should be quite objective, avoiding attacks on the regime and name-calling. This would do something new to the Germans, give them hope that the enemy, once in Germany, will be "reasonable". It will reduce their will to resist Germany's defeat which is now largely stimulated by despair.

The messages should be delivered by Americans or in the name of some representative American, if he or she cannot speak German. Emigrants and refugees should disappear from

the air altogether. The purpose of the personal messages is to undermine the prevalent belief that Germans must stand or fall with Hitler. A human bond will be created, especially if the messages reveal correctly the innermost thoughts of many Germans concerning their relationship to Hitlerism. The messages should be directed to various groups in turn -- women, first of all, youth, academicians, <sup>soldiers</sup> the specific conflict of each being analyzed.

However, with the progress of the United Nations' victory and the German defeat the language used in addressing Germans should become less and less propagandistic. For example, there will then be no use in telling them what they are already only too painfully aware of: that Hitler has failed criminally, and that the German Army is doomed.

The aim must now be to instill in the Germans the feeling that fate is approaching relentlessly, inexorably. It can be achieved both by what is said and what is obviously left unsaid. The Germans should be given the least possible opportunity to debate, discuss and criticize the intentions of the Allies. Remembering the extensive explanations of 1918-19 and accustomed to Hitler's oratory, the Germans will expect more of the same now.

They must be impressed by facts and orders. This is the most effective method the United Nations can adopt under the circumstances.

At this time they should also not make the Germans any

- 3 -

promises. These tactics will prove to be effective both psychologically and politically. Defeat and the sudden relief from the pressure under which the Germans have lived since 1933 may well give rise to mass-hysteria. The Allies should therefore concentrate on one reason in explaining the policies they intend to follow with respect to Germany after the collapse and in defining the peace or the peace conditions they will have to proclaim before the cooling-off period starts.

In public they should <sup>say that they</sup> base their decisions solely on the necessity of doing everything necessary to avert for good further German aggression. In their own interest, the Germans must be forced to face the facts, must not be allowed to take refuge in illusions. The proclamation of one sole reason will come as a shock. And a shock is essential to render the Germans amenable to the establishment of an occupation authority in their territory. Only in this manner will they be induced to see in what direction their future policies should be focused.

The dressing up of "Free Germany" committees would inevitably lead to just the opposite result. It would raise hope that the victors will be easy, ready to make far-reaching concessions, even change their principle - a preventive peace.

These are considerations for what has been called, for simplicity's sake, the psychological viewpoint.

Now for the political usefulness of the one-motive-method of infiltration. It corresponds exactly to the core of the political theory and propaganda of Nazism and German National-

- 4 -

ism in general. It makes the national self-interest of the United Nations the driving motive of their policies with respect to Germany. It takes the wind out of any criticisms the nationalists would otherwise make, as it is a practical approach that will appeal to German reasoning.

While the United Nations will omit explanations from their official pronouncements, it can do no harm if (prepared) articles and radio speeches from reputed sources <sup>the</sup> emanate from/United Nations taking up also their basic argument but supplementing it with historical and moral observations. Again this should be done in a rather terse and unemotional manner to convince the Germans more firmly that the United Nations policy is absolutely simple, and that, for all practical purposes, discussion will be superfluous. This will have a sobering effect on the Germans.

As said above, the nearer the hour of actual surrender approaches, the more factual and matter of fact should the Political Warfare messages become. They could probably start now and continue during the first phases of surrender.

In the phase of actual collapse it may be useful to confine all broadcasts to news of events. No hint of United Nations intentions should be given. This will enhance the uncertainty in Germany, add to the nervous tension, and establish unequivocally the absolute determination of the United Nations. No threats, expressions of triumph, or anything that might tend to weaken the impression of fate creep-

- 5 -

ing up on them should be transmitted to Germany.

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When the break-down has reached the point where direct interference in German affairs is possible, the United Nations should give orders, only orders.

Here follows a memorandum written by someone who played a prominent part during the collapse in Germany in 1918, in fact, <sup>primarily</sup> was/responsible for preventing the anarchy then threatening. He deals with the first orders the United Nations should give this time.

"To the farthest extent possible orders for peace-time production must be prepared now.

"With the cessation of hostilities all orders for war production will be stopped. In the United States and England this will probably occur gradually. On the Hitler-controlled European continent production will cease immediately, however.

"At present the Nazi government is the only buyer of industrial production on the European continent. With the end of the war this buyer will disappear. Buyers must be created to replace the Nazi government.

"These buyers must be ready to place orders for peace-time production simultaneous with the disappearance of the Nazi war and its industrial needs. If there are no buyers and consequently no demands for production, the factories will close.

- 6 -

"To Germany and the occupied countries the closing of factories means unemployed workers by the millions. Throwing millions on the street without any resources after long years of exhaustion and starvation will bring anarchy to the whole European continent. Only through the medium of industrial production can the millions be kept employed and anarchy prevented.

"In the past we were taught that without political order there can be no industrial production. We must now realize that without industrial production there can be no political order.

"The seemingly fantastic job of preparing for peace-time production cannot wait until ownership is restored and complicated legal questions are settled. It can and must be done as soon as it is possible. There is no other way to prevent anarchy in Europe and to achieve the aims we are fighting for."

Concerning war prisoners and foreign workers the author wrote:

"The immediate task is to prepare means to bring food and medical supplies to the following categories of distressed persons in time:

- 1) War and civilian prisoners and forced laborers in Germany
- 2) War and civilian prisoners and forced laborers in German-occupied territories
- 3) Germans and persons who are ethnically German but

- 7 -

are citizens of other countries, who were settled by the Nazi government, mostly by force, in the occupied countries from the Baltic states, from Bessarabia, and from Soviet Russia. In all probability none of them will be allowed to remain where they are, nor will they be permitted in most cases to return to where they came from.

"No matter under what conditions the supplying of these groups is effected, experience has shown that the collapse of local authorities is fraught with danger. The collapse of local authorities, military and civilian, is inevitable in Germany and the occupied countries the moment Germany faces military defeat or a revolutionary uprising. The majority of the guards in the prison camps will leave their posts, many for the sake of their own safety, for fear of revenge, and others out of concern for their families.

"War and civilian prisoners will thus be left to shift for themselves. Food and other supplies, until now provided for them by the Nazi authorities, will stop. Factories will be closed and forced laborers will likewise be left to their own devices. More than five million of the latter are spread throughout Germany at present. Hundreds of thousands of these prisoners will leave the camps, storm the food store houses, shops and private homes. Many will take railroad stations by force, trying to return home. Some will be



- 8 -

involved in local disorders; looting, robbery, murders and rape will be the consequence. Many will be killed. Such events cannot be avoided entirely, but they can be reduced to a minimum if plans are carefully and fully mapped out in advance.

"Experience makes me deeply concerned over the prospect of anarchical conditions. By adequate measures, thoroughly prepared in advance, these people can be kept where they are at the moment of collapse and taken care of until means for their dispersal are available. Only in this case can the people be guarded against becoming victims of internal German disorder and supplies reach those for whom they are intended." \*)

These orders should be proclaimed quite monotonously four or five times for some days even after United Nations troops have reached German soil. The very fact that the United Nations take such a step will rub in the completeness of defeat.

It should also be stated that any violence during the interval when Germany might be a political "no-man's-land" will later be punished by the occupation authorities. Even if the persons with whom the armistice is concluded represent some central authority in Germany it should never be mentioned.

b) The author of both memoranda is M. Schlesinger of Baltimore, Md. who handled the repatriation of war prisoners during and after the armistice of November 1918. Later he was Consul General and Director of the Economic Department for the East in the Auswaertiges Amt until 1933.

As soon as the authority the United Nations intend to recognize has been decided upon definitely it should be taken cognizance of. It might be expedient to call the armistice officially a surrender as in German armistice has a temporary, provisional meaning, implying, as a rule, negotiations.

The United Nations should be intent on influencing the German attitude by consistent, decisive, even peremptory action. The more the impression is given that they are dealing with Germany and the Germans according to a well-conceived, organized, and definite plan, the better. The greater the speed with which they take Germany in hand the less the Germans will think about what they might do or what might have been, or of resistance. Since 1933 they have become thoroughly accustomed to hard-fisted methods, and have been taught that the Anglo-Saxons are easy marks. Especially will those who have become Nazified have a good lesson.

To give the population another wholesome shock "civilian commandos" should enter Germany even before the "surrender" has been signed and penetrate to as many major centers as possible. Equipped with two-way radio sets they should inform designated occupation authorities about the state of affairs in Germany. They themselves should not assume any authority or give information, but they should assure the people that they will be dealt with fairly and humanely, and promise material help in case of need. They should make all the contacts they can with persons who are known to be not in

- 13 -

sympathy with Nazism, and gather information. A list of such persons can and should be prepared immediately.

The commandos should start by car and without military guards as soon as the frontiers are open sufficiently to risk such an enterprise. They should have credentials stating that they are ordered to proceed into Germany forthwith and must be given all necessary facilities by "whom it may concern". German authorities should simply be ignored. Incidents may occur but are not likely.

The civilian commandos will await the arrival of the occupation forces, serving as proof to the population of the absoluteness of defeat at the very beginning and the effectiveness of the United Nations organization in taking over Germany.

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The longer the United Nations keep silent with respect to the conditions of surrender, of peace, and the details of the occupation, the more clear will the immutability of their intentions be. The population must learn of them through hard facts rather than through announcements. The sole reason for the actions of the occupation authorities and the United Nations governments must be repeated frequently in connection with the surrender and peace measures. The speculative German mind is given to all kinds of ratiocinations obscuring reality, especially in the political orbit. This is an era of words. In consequence, words have lost much of their weight. Political warfare, which will last long after hostilities have ceased,

- 11 -

should use words sparingly. The new method, taciturnity, will take the Germans by surprise.

United Nations tactics in imposing their decisions, as far as they are concerned with the liquidation of the war, are not necessarily identical with the day by day activities of the occupation authorities. As a matter of fact, they should be different in both tone and methods.

Germany must be made to understand fully that she has to bear the consequences of Hitler's war. On the other hand, a clear demarcation line should be drawn between past and present Germany. The new German government should not be treated as a scapegoat for its predecessor. Taking its readiness to cooperate with the occupation authorities in restoring order and employment, and accelerating recovery, as a matter of course will have a suggestive effect on Germans. Any undertone of reproach, revenge, harshness, or masterfulness should be avoided in official and unofficial intercourse with the Germans. Also in this respect it is important to avoid building up a case for nationalism, offering opportunities for cries of "oppression" and "Germany in fetters". The greatest possible freedom should be given the German administration to write its own prescriptions for the ailing nation.

This will come as another surprise and shock to the Germans who will expect a treatment tainted with hostility and contempt. Some will even hope for that in order to work up nationalistic indignation. It is a primary interest of the

- 12 -

United Nations to let all such hopes fall flat. Any attempt at education would be incompatible with this policy.

The Allies cannot leave Germany without hope. It lies in the nature of a preventive, a safeguarding, peace as proposed by the Western Allies that the one way to create hope is the reorganization of the continent on more rational foundations, <sup>the</sup> "Europeanization of Europe".

In her hour of defeat Germany will burn with all sorts of ideas about her future. One of the soundest and strongest is the desire for just such a reconstruction of inter-European relations. The strongest single political factor after the war will be the working class which has always been "internationalist".

A "new Europe" turning out as a definite possibility would create an effective counter-weight to radical social, economic, and political currents.

Yet, again, a hopeful perspective, such as the integration of Europe, should not be introduced as a formal promise in official documents concerning the settlements. It should at once be given reality by suitable initial or preparatory steps in which Germany should be included as soon as she has a stable government.

It must be shown that her position in Europe depends on the degree to which she adapts herself willingly and constructively to her new circumstances.

Any definite intention to reorganize Europe should be

- 13 -

communicated to the Germans as soon as possible.

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Thus infiltration into Germany should concentrate on factual shocks and faits accomplis with the exception of the personal messages which will serve as a transition from pure war propaganda to the period of surrender.

The general aim of infiltration should be to force the Germans to face facts, to permeate them with the realization that discussion is fruitless, that their one hope lies in collaboration with the United Nations, and that they have the slogans of the Hitlerites and the militaristic brand of nationalism in general to thank for provoking the Allies to use the same methods in dealing with them.

Conversely, the vanquished should be assured that the past belongs to the past, that they are given credit for having honestly repudiated Nazism. To speak continuously of Germany's lasting guilt in bringing about the war would only result in endless discussion and a strong new nationalist front. This eventuality must be avoided by every means possible.

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2. findings of the investigation. It is based on the  
3. information received from the sources and the  
4. results of the interviews. The summary is as follows:  
5. The investigation was conducted from January 1, 1964,  
6. to January 15, 1964. It was carried out by  
7. the Special Agent in Charge, [redacted], and  
8. the Special Agent, [redacted]. The results of the  
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### Additional Observations

It will be impossible for the United Nations to impose their will on the Germans and they will only do harm if they try to substitute their will for that of the Germans. Germany might become democratic in the true sense of the word, her will to power in its present form might be broken, but only <sup>if</sup> she herself forms a new conception of state-life for herself, that is to say, the Germans must be spared the feeling that they have been persuaded, cajoled or forced in whatever direction they take.

Germany will be put under, it seems, very considerable material restrictions in consequence of the surrender and the peace. All the more will she be jealous of her intellectual independence and liberties.

At the same time she will have learned her lesson during the years of Hitlerism. The world may be surprised by the intellectual initiative and creativeness that will emerge after the downfall of Hitlerism.

The "guilt" complex is a precarious matter. It caused endless discussion and embitterment after 1919. Every effort should be made this time to give the minimum of ammunition to nationalist propaganda, to simplify the issues, to "ration politics". The general trend in Germany will be in fact toward work, quiet and rest from political crises.

Such as many persons, especially among the educated, will be ashamed of the blows the Hitler regime has inflicted

- 2 -

on Germany's name, most of them will deny that the German nation can be "collectively" guilty. They will also say that the theory of Germany's responsibility for Hitler's deeds is refuted by the assumption of the United Nations themselves that Germany has lived under a tyranny since 1933. They will add that the masses, when they applauded Hitler, certainly did not know where he was leading them step by step, that the war came as a surprise to most of them, that they were ignorant of most of the crimes the Hitlerites committed, news of which leaked to them only bit by bit..

Probably punishment of the leading and otherwise criminal Nazis by the United Nations will be understood; at least the Germans will take it in their stride. But interference with their domestic affairs is another matter: it does not belong to the liquidation of the past. It would hurt their pride and pervert the sound tendencies that will come to light, much stronger than is generally expected, with the eclipse of Nazism.

The dismemberment of the Reich can have only pernicious consequences for all concerned.

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The above recommendations concerning infiltration are made on the assumption that the Western Allies will be the winners, at least predominantly so. But it must be said that even the mere threat that the Soviets will take over power

- 3 -

would profoundly change the situation in Germany.

Whatever shape defeat takes, the inhabitants of eastern Germany, in the neighborhood of the long-suffering Czechoslovakians, Poles, etc. may stampede westwards. If they do, all Germany will be thrown into turmoil.

There is also the possibility that the alluring assurances spread by the "Free Germany" committee in Moscow will have far-reaching effects provided the Red Army reaches the German frontier before the United Nations. So far no counterweight exists to the all-comprehensive program of "Free Germany", created by the great Western Allies; its lack may have serious consequences.

Even now many persons and groups in Germany are debating hotly whether it would not be preferable to entrust Germany to the Soviets rather than surrender unconditionally to the Western Allies from whom they expect only an intensified second Versailles Treaty which would jeopardize the very existence of Germany. The writer has been informed during the last weeks that even among the former enemies of the Soviet Union, the moderate Social Democrats, here in refuge, the idea has become discussible, ~~unacceptable~~, that nothing is left for Germany except to "turn toward the East".

That Ketz, former member of Marshal v. Paulus' staff at Stalingrad, is now in the Presidium of the German committee in Moscow may indicate a pro-Soviet trend among German of-

- 4 -

ficers.

Experts on German economy are often inclined to believe that the destruction of German industry and of the whole economic fabric of Germany through the bombings and various war measures of the Nazis will have reached such dimensions by the end of the war, not to mention other destructive factors, that capitalism will be practically non-existent. This would mean that the chances of Socialism in Germany will be enhanced proportionally.

The writer is not quite so pessimistic. But there is no doubt that communistic and semi-communistic trends and machinations in Germany will be supported strongly by circumstances. This will play into the hands of the men in Moscow who aim at achieving a maximum dependency of Germany on the Soviet Union.

Generally speaking, Moscow's policy of promises to Germany, meticulously avoiding the trap of unconditional surrender, has a realistic background. Should the unity of the Reich be menaced by the United Nations' peace plans the odds will become strongly in favor of the Soviet Union.

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**SECRET**

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Secretariat  
FROM: O. S. Platt

DATE: 9 Aug. '43

SUBJECT: Summary of Notes on Situation and Strategy.  
From General Fellers to General Donovan.

July 21. The Moscow Manifesto must be considered a first step in a negotiated peace between Russia and Germany.

1. Both nations are war weary.
2. Both nations have interests in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
3. In peace time economy they complement each other.
4. Stalin may feel justified in making a separate peace due to our repudiation of a full scale invasion in 1941.

A negotiated peace would release 200 German divisions to protect the Western Front making the invasion of Europe too costly to contemplate.

Britain would make peace with Germany to off-set the growing power of Russia. Unable to control the situation we would have to follow Britain.

Counter measures. United Nations should <sup>start</sup> ~~take~~ all possible measures and clarify all promises to Russia to avoid such a peace move.

As the Moscow Manifesto offers better terms to Germany than "Unconditional Surrender", we must be prepared to modify our terms to the German People -- once the Nazis are beaten.

1. Peace with honor.
2. Territorial integrity.
3. Security against the vengeance of European neighbors.
4. Protection for a liberal government chosen by the people.

**SECRET**

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Secretariat

- 2 -

9 August 1943

July 24 -- Situation Estimate.

The United States alone is demanding "Unconditional Surrender" in two wars.

1. The Racial War in the Pacific.
2. The Social and Political War in Europe.

A rapid decision is essential to avoid:

1. A negotiated peace between Russia and Germany; China and Japan.
2. A deterioration of our home front.
3. <sup>DISSEMINATION</sup> Depletion of American resources.
4. Collapse of European civilization.
5. World wide intensification of racial differences.

To win the war rapidly we should change our strategy from "trial and error", "wait and see" which is the British plan, to an over-all plan, fitted closely into a time schedule.

Recommendations:-

1. U. S. should take the leadership of a United Nations plan to "win the war now".
2. U. S. effort should retain its independence and individuality.
3. The Pacific Command should be unified.
4. We should shift our weight to the Pacific because ~~main~~ time is working for Japan.
5. U. S. home front should be strengthened.
6. U. S. war aims should be announced.

*L.P.*  
U.S.P.

**SECRET**

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: General William J. Donovan

Date: August 13, 1943

From: Mary C. Rade

Subject:

A German woman who up to 1928 was a prominent Communist in Germany is in this country now under another name. I met her once in Berlin in 1928 in the house of Alexandra Kollontay who at that time also took part in an anti-Stalin conspiracy.

On account of terror, G.P.U. and other Russian imported methods she gradually withdrew from the Communist Party. In the following years she and the Communist Party hated each other.

I do not know what her political convictions are today. I know that she is afraid of the revenge of the Communist Party.

I heard by chance that she came to this country from France.

After the "German Manifesto" I looked her up and asked her to interpret the Manifesto. She is very intelligent but also very prejudiced. I found her explanation of why the Comintern was dissolved quite interesting.



The mysterious passage of the dissolution of the Comintern interpreted so frequently as a friendly gesture for the democratic countries is solved. It is quite to the contrary a very important part of Stalin's blue-print for post-war Germany and post-war Europe. Stalin had to disband the Comintern to make the way free for a serious offer to the German army. This serious offer followed the dissolution edict very closely and was made through the declaration of the "Free Germans", which practically includes all teams for a separate peace with Russia. The clue to the declaration is to be found in the lines speaking "of the finest sons of Germany", "von Stein, Arndt, Clausewitz, York and others", who, after having served under Napoleon, went over to Russia and prepared the liberation-war of Prussia under the leadership of Czar Alexander I. York and Clausewitz concluded the neutrality convention at Taureggen in 1813 with the Russians and prepared then the fight against Napoleon in 1813. (Note: after having checked with some people who at one time were close to the Nazis, I learned that "Taureggen 1813" has been used widely as a slogan with the young Nazis. It plays a part in Nazi literature. ROR) To put aside this clear-cut essential political line of the declaration and to soothe the public here with nonsense about "psychological warfare" is very shortsighted and foolish.

The chances of such an offer are tremendously increased by the collapse of Italy. The German army will not run into the catastrophe with open eyes without trying a retreat to a "minimum program". It is very possible that a split inside the Nazi party will open the way to such an arrangement. This split would be

- 2 -

the transitory stage in the construction of a new totalitarian German party, completely dominated by Stalin's stooges. The combination of officers, of men of Prussian tradition, and of outstanding Communists is an old one and has deep roots both in the Communist Party of Germany and in the Nazi Party.

The Communist Party of Germany has a very honest past. It was the only group in the time of the First World War who fought consequently and militantly against German Imperialism and against the war. Its leaders, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, from the beginning opposed the program of world conquest of German Imperialism and educated their followers in this spirit. They were murdered by the forerunners of the Nazis and hundreds and thousands of German Communists lost their life in the struggles after the war against the reconstruction of an army of revenge.

The Communist Party of Germany was from all the parties of the Weimars the only party with a real mass-basis and a real mass-organization (perhaps including the Czech Party). It had a membership varying between 150,000 and 300,000 members and five million votes. But this fact alone is not so important, as the fact that the Communist Party was transformed by Stalinism into a party of totalitarian character already at the time of the Weimar Republic. The various party crises created by Russian interference formed a leadership of brutal, unscrupulous GPU-type; American or British Communists <sup>might</sup> have to defend the GPU-methods or to write reports, but the German Communist leaders were from the active GPU-work, they had to deliver their

- 3 -

political brothers to the hangman or to act personally as hangmen themselves.

The leading figures of Stalin's "Free Germany", Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht, are the best samples for this new type: Wilhelm Pieck delivered to the hangman his comrades of the old Spartacus Band, for instance Hugo Eberlein, one of the disciples of Rosa Luxemburg. Walter Ulbricht was Chairman of the GPU-Commission in Spain; he tortured and killed German Socialists and Communists of all shades, personally.

Stalin knows that Europe will fall to him, after the Nazi breakdown. That is the inevitable result of the Russian victory. The Balkans, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Baltic Countries and France under the leadership of De Gaulle are overripe for this development. Stalin must offer to his own army and his own military caste - gaining in weight every day - as price for the terrible devastation of Russia, a Russian-dominated Europe. That is not only necessary from the Russian point of view against the domination of the world by a British-American Alliance, but it is necessary from the point of view of the inner-political situation in Russia after the war. Stalin's plans center around the incorporation of a weakened, reduced Germany in the Russian "Lebensraum", but a Germany possessing a "Glenskowitz army", reconstructing a totalitarian Germany under the tutelage of Russia, and being an enormous "Foreign Legion" of "Free Germany", in the service of Russia.

The combination of the Russian and German army for the fight against the West and the domination of Europe is a long-conceived

- 4 -

plan. The whole policy of the German Communist Party before Hitler came into power was orientated in the direction of the support of the growing Nazi movement (for this fact innumerable proofs and personal evidence can be given). Also, inside the army and the Nazi Party the tendency for the "Eastern Orientation" was always very strong. In the time of the underground movement, the policy of the "Trojan Horse" has sent many members of the Communist Party into the Nazi Party, many others were won over by the Nazis in the first period after their triumph. The transformation of the Nazi Party into a Stalinist Party, after a "purge" of Hitler and his caucus, will surprise the world.

It is obvious that Stalin does not want the United Nations in Berlin. His blueprint means to restrict them to a zone as West and as South as possible (Holland, Belgium, parts of Norway, Italy, Greece). He wants not at all "revolution". In fact, he fears revolution more than the ultra-reactionaries of all countries. But he knows equally that in Europe only the ruins of the bourgeois society are existing. He knows further that the reconstruction of this bourgeois society is an impossible task. His happy blending of GPU and Prussian officers, trained in the bloodiest form of oppression of all democratic tendencies shall fulfill the double task of building a barrier against the West, of preparing a strong Russian position in the coming world conflicts and of crushing every potential anti-Stalinist, democratic and labor movement inside and outside Russia.

*Germany 1/2 231*  
*X T. Lee Wetman*  
 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C. *X Russia*  
*X Camp, Elizabeth*

SECRET

20 August 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN R. DEANE:

Here is a memorandum based on conferences held with certain Russian officials now in this country. It was prepared by certain members of our office.

Maybe it would be of interest in considering some of the problems now before the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*W. J. Donovan*  
 William J. Donovan  
 Director

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Brig. General William J. Donovan  
FROM: John C. Hughes  
SUBJECT:

DATE: August 16, 1945

Miss Garp of this office has prepared a memorandum on the Political Impact of the Formation of the Free Germany Committee in Moscow. Her memorandum is based on conversation held with certain Russian officials now in this country.

I am sure you will find it of considerable interest, and I am sending the original of the same herewith.

J. C. H.

Enclosure

SECRET

August 11, 1943

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**REPORT ON THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE FORMATION OF  
THE "COMMITTEE FOR FREE GERMANY" IN MOSCOW, AND ITS  
APPEAL TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE**

**Based on Conversations held with Russian Officials  
residing in this Country.**

Russian propaganda among German prisoners of war became very intensive after the victory of Stalingrad. Most of the officers and soldiers taken prisoners in the months of January and February 1943 were put in concentration camps in Central Siberia. A special service undertook all the propaganda work and organized anti-Nazi groups throughout the camps. This service not only provided the prisoners with anti-Nazi literature, i.e. leaflets and pamphlets, but in addition, appointed lecturers, who went from one camp to the other making speeches and conferences. The main part of this propaganda work (directed by a commission of Soviet officers and officials), is attributed to Wilhelm Flock from Berlin, a former Communist deputy to the Reichstag, and later a member of the Central Committee of the Reichstag, and to German writers of communistic tendencies, such as Johannes Hecker from Munich, William Brudel from Hamburg, and the Berlin poet Erik Weisert. Special newspapers were printed for the prisoners, and newspapers were placed in each camp almost every day.

2.

In the month of April last, intensive preparations were carried on for a conference by representatives of anti-Nazi groups of German war prisoners. The Russians admit that it is hard to say whether these representatives really reflect an anti-Hitlerite tendency prevailing among war prisoners or whether they are merely isolated individuals lured by promises of material advantages made to them by the Soviet Government. Only one thing is certain: almost every German prisoner passes through a minute political cross-examination, and such officers and soldiers who show an anti-Nazi spirit are registered and put in special groups. Their statements are then published in Moscow papers, in Information Bureau bulletins and are reproduced in articles by various writers. For instance, the interview with the pilot Count Heinrich von Kinsiedel, great grandson of Riemann, was published in March 1943.

The conference by the representatives of German war prisoners and German political refugees was held in Moscow on July 12 and July 13, 1943. Among those taking part were 13 commissioned officers, eight soldiers and twelve political refugees, mostly communists or fellow travelers. These thirty-three men who formed the "Free Germany Committee" undertook the following program: to publish a Manifesto on July 21; start a series of regular broadcasts to the German people; and issue a weekly paper in the German language entitled the "Free Germany".

The fact that the publication of this Manifesto occurred eight days after the conference shows plainly that the Russians timed



34

it simultaneously with the offensive drive at Orel, and that Moscow attaches great importance to propaganda as a means of psychological warfare.

The Russians never miss an opportunity to undermine the morale of the German people and of the German Army. For example, whenever there is a lull on the front, special men equipped with radio sets and loud speakers crawl out of the Russian lines, dig shelters and send out appeals to the German soldiers, and although hundreds of such propagandists are killed by German fire, the Russian Command maintains this form of propaganda systematically and unceasingly. (Reports on the above have been published in the Moscow newspapers).

The Soviets believe that Allied propaganda in Germany is insufficient since it does not incite the German people to revolt. Furthermore, they are convinced that if appeals for a rebellion come from a German organization, they will create a much stronger impression on the civilian population of the Reich and even on the soldiers who today are weary of a prolonged and unsuccessful campaign in Russia. In short, the Committee of the German prisoners of war and its Manifesto serve the Russian purposes to perfection.

But the formation of this Committee and the broadcasting of its appeal raises another question, namely: to what extent does this move disclose the true intentions of the Soviets as regards Germany, and what is its importance in connection with the general attitude of Moscow towards her Allies?

4.

Russians here say that we must not make the error of identifying the statements contained in the Manifesto as commitments from Stalin and that the Soviet Government is not responsible for what the Germans say to their own people, yet they admit that no Committee of German War Prisoners and political refugees could have been set up in Moscow without the help and full approval of their Government. As a matter of fact, the Manifesto carefully avoids any pro-Communist allusion. It promises not only the restoration of the four freedoms (which do not exist in Russia, anyway), but speaks also of the "freedom of economy, trade and handicrafts" and even of the "restoration of property to their lawful owners". Generally speaking, the political program of the Manifesto (which was published in full by all the Russian newspapers in Moscow) is a democratic one and does not imply in any way a Sovietization of Germany; it does not even mention socialistic measures in economic life. This in itself is another proof that the Russians used the Manifesto as a means of propaganda.

To the inquiry how far the program of the Manifesto corresponds to the program of the Soviets, they reply that according to all information and statements made public by the Moscow Government, the outlines of Russian policy towards Germany could be formulated as follows:

1) The Russians demand a complete physical and moral eradication of Nazism in Germany. They do not believe in half-measures

5.

and fear a "blackmailing move" on the part of Army Generals who might even remove Hitler in order to seize power and negotiate with the Allies. Moscow considers all the German chiefs as pure militarists inspired by dreams of conquest. In the opinion of Moscow, none of them are to be trusted. No military Government in Germany would offer any guarantee to Moscow.

2) The Soviets believe that the German people can give only one proof of its good will, i.e. revolt against Hitler. Though Stalin does not believe -- and never did believe -- in a German revolution without a preliminary military defeat of Germany, the Russians are convinced that no radical change could ever come about in Germany without a revolt of the people. In this connection, a Soviet official in this country very cynically remarked:

"Neither the British nor the Americans nor the Russians dare make a blood bath in Germany, though such a bath is badly needed. Even if the Soviets occupied Germany, we cannot offer to the world the picture of mass executions and court martial sentences. To really get rid of a future German menace, it is necessary to kill several million Germans. Since we are unable to proceed and accomplish such a massacre, LET THE GERMANS DO IT THEMSELVES. There will be no safety for Europe without a good purge of the Nazis. We must therefore do our utmost to incite the German people to do this dirty work themselves. All our propaganda must continue and unceasingly urge the Germans to revolt and to exterminate the Nazis."

Of course, such statements are unofficial, but, from all accounts, almost every other army commander in Russia and every political leader more or less shares such an opinion.

3) The post-war treatment of Germany depends largely on

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what the German people are going to do. If they show that they are able to get rid of Hitler and achieve a real purge in their country, the Russians may be magnanimous. But the question of security is the main issue with which Russia is concerned. The Soviets are determined to deprive Germany of any and every possibility of a military resurrection. The whole foreign policy of the Soviets as regards Germany is going to be based on this fundamental principle.

4) Moscow agrees with the principle of "unconditional surrender" but is concerned about its mechanism. Who is going to offer the "unconditional surrender" in case of a German collapse? As long as Russia does not want to negotiate with a Government composed of Generals, obviously the only other alternative would be some anti-Fascist Government which might arise from a popular revolt. The German Committee in Moscow might be considered as a preliminary instrument toward unleashing revolutionary forces in Germany, and it might also be able to play a prominent part in the creation of a democratic Government at the right moment.

5) The question of a possible revival of German imperialism after Hitler's defeat seems to be of great concern to Stalin. It is pointed out that in his statement about Poland, Stalin said that a strong and independent Poland could, after the war, conclude an agreement with Russia against "our common foe". Russia will demand territorial and military guarantees for her own security.

7.

She will also insist on having the leading role in the control of Germany and in the fulfillment of all the conditions imposed on the Germans by the Allies.

6) Russians here say that according to the many indications coming directly from Moscow, their Government is quite willing to adopt with the Allies a common and unified policy towards Germany in the post-war era. But there are certain points on which Moscow is going to show grim determination. First of all, the Soviets insist on the fact that Russia, being the strongest and largest continental power in Europe and also a close neighbor of Germany, should have a predominant position in all post-war settlement concerning Central and South Eastern Europe. They know that foreign observers and diplomats may dislike this attitude, but they have to accept it. In Moscow today, the Russian press and Soviet historians repeatedly recall that Napoleon himself realized that Russia was the key of Europe and that the defeat of England alone would not have brought him domination over Europe. They also point out continuously that Hitler's plan of dominating Europe could never be fulfilled without the conquest of Russia. By all these arguments Russia endeavors to prove her right in claiming the leading role in Europe and especially in Central and South Eastern Europe.

As of special significance are certain hints in Russian scientific reviews ("Historical Review" of 1943); "Under the Banner of Marxism", 1943; "World's Economics and Politics", etc.) on the

causes of the failure of the Treaty of Versailles. This Treaty, the Russians say, attempted to organize a European order, after the war, without Russia. Russia was eliminated from all settlements and was absent from European affairs for many years. This war the main cause of the failure of the Versailles structure and also of the second World War. To repeat such blunders would be fatal. No stability in Europe can be created without Russia or without her full and free consent.

Speaking about the Manifesto of Free Germany, a Soviet diplomat in Washington declared that:

"As far as the outline of our foreign policy is concerned, any Government in Moscow would have acted in the same way, even had we had a reactionary Government instead of our present Communist regime."

The Soviets maintain that the USSR is the heir of the Russian Empire and they regret that their attitude in many issues is badly misunderstood, for "it is not communistic, not imperialistic, it is simply 'imperial'".

7) This feeling of her leading role is much stronger in Russia this year than it was in 1942. Last summer the military situation seemed extremely grave, it was more than doubtful whether Russia would be able to deal with the triumphant German offensive in the South East. This year the situation is reversed. With the defeat of Stalingrad, the Russians took the initiative on the Eastern Front. They claim that Germany could have been crushed this year had the Allies distracted some 60 divisions on any second

9.

front. The lack of Allied land operations on a large scale makes the Russians very bitter and gives them the feeling that they are playing the most important but the most expensive part in the destruction of the German war machine. Hence the statement of high army officials, repeated by Russian military officers passing through the United States, that:

"We earned the right not only to be admired or respected, but also to have a voice in every question dealing with Germany and Central Europe".

At a conference of Soviet writers held in Moscow in April 1943, one of them proclaimed:

"Our country has lost millions of her sons. We made these terrific sacrifices not for dreams of conquest or domination. We do not want to dominate anybody, but we do want to create a situation in Germany and in the neighboring States whereby a repetition of such an ordeal as the present war will be avoided in the future."

In general, the Russians invariably express the opinion that their role in the post-war Europe should be proportionate to what they performed during the war.

6) At the risk of repetition, it must be added that the Soviets in this country, perhaps on the ground of information which they receive from many sources, constantly emphasize that this important role which the USSR is preparing to play does not include, at least for the present, a plan of sovietization of Germany and neighboring States - always excepting the Baltic States, the Eastern provinces of Poland taken in 1939 and Bessarabia, which are considered parts of the Soviet Union.

10.

The reasons given are always the same: a) The popular hatred of the Germans in Russia is so strong that Moscow would be embarrassed by a communistic Germany with which she would be obliged to entertain friendly relations. It would tie her hands as far as anti-German measures were concerned. Russia will, therefore, be satisfied with a strong anti-Fascist Government, some sort of a Popular Front. b) The question of security overshadows in Moscow any other preoccupation. Stalin is ready to sacrifice everything for a solid guarantee of security which would give him the possibility of peaceful reconstruction. As a shrewd and realistic statesman, he knows very well that the Russian people cannot continue to live under the dreadful conditions created by the war. The Soviets will be faced with huge problems: the reorganization of the country's economy, the question of food supplies, the return to normal conditions, etc. The devastation wrought by the Germans in the occupied provinces surpasses all the destruction caused by them in other countries of Europe. Therefore, the Russians say:

"The task which is awaiting us is tremendous. We must have security in order to restore a more or less bearable existence to millions of people".

Moscow does not expect to be helped very effectively in this gigantic work of reconstruction by either America or Great Britain. The Soviets believe that the Anglo-Americans will have their hands full with Western Europe. In any case, they want to rely as far as possible on their own domestic forces; they are distrustful of foreign capital and eager to promote the exploitation of their own resources.



11.

and the building up of their own industry.

9) The Russians believe that the moment has come to intensify their propaganda in Germany. They were not sure last year that the time was ripe. Now, when the morale of the German people and of the Army is shattered by the reverses on the Eastern front, the loss of Africa, the Allied bombings of Germany and the recent events in Italy, when the Allies are at the gates of Hitler's fortress (to use the expression of the Manifesto of Free Germany), Moscow considers the moment propitious for an attempt to disintegrate the enemy from inside. They know that resistance in occupied countries and popular movements in Germany are bound to play an important part.

10) Therefore, the Russians were very surprised by the unfavorable reaction of the Anglo-American press to the formation of the Free Germany Committee. They pointed out that their action has the same character as that of the Allied propaganda in Italy. They quote the London Committee of Italian refugees which is carrying on a similar line of political propaganda. In private conversations they never miss an opportunity of making ironical remarks about those Stoepians who would like to bring Otto Von Hapsburg back to Vienna. They also quote the following statement made by representatives of the Russian Jewish Committee, Michaels and Pfeffer, reported to be said in this country:

"Since the State Department in Washington is seeking advice on the German situation from Bruening and

12.

Previously, why should not our own Foreign Office use Weisert (the president of the Committee of Free Germany) Major Karl Meis and Count Von Einsiedel (the two Vice-Presidents of the same Committee). The latter might prove to be more useful than old German statesmen who have no contact with the existing underground movement in their country?"

11) According to the Russian version, the Soviets disagree with Allied commentators who claim that the promise contained in the Manifesto of a Free and Independent Germany, contradicts the main lines of Allied policy, for nobody considers a military occupation of Germany as a lasting measure, but rather as a temporary means of crushing German imperialism and of controlling German industry, as well as the complete disarmament of the German army. In their opinion, the character of this occupation depends entirely on the evolution of military events and on the capacity of the Germans themselves to overthrow the present regime.

The Soviets in this country also point out that the idea of a disarmament of Germany and of her re-education under a regime of Anglo-American occupation would be very displeasing to Moscow. Since Germany cannot be wiped out, her re-education should be the task, not of the Anglo-Saxons, but of the German people themselves, with a sincere effort towards international collaboration.

12) Various commentators in Great Britain and the United States have expressed the opinion that the formation of the Committee of Free Germany constituted the answer of the Soviet Government to

13.

the establishment by the Germans of a Government led by General Vlasov.

On the contrary, the Russians consider the Vlasov affair as a failure. The Germans did succeed in assembling a few thousand men (about 5,000) under General Vlasov. This "army" did not inspire much confidence and was never sent to the front. The attempt to enlarge it by draft of White Russians in France failed completely, which explains why Vlasov and his detachments are only used as a police force in occupied countries, namely Yugoslavia and Poland. The Soviets believe that the Germans will hold on desperately to the Russian territories occupied by them and that they need Russian traitors to help them organize labor and the economic exploitation of those provinces. Vlasov is the man chosen for this task.

In conclusion, the Russians consider that the downfall of Mussolini and the recent events in Italy strengthened the position of the Committee of Free Germany in Moscow. They now intend to intensify their propaganda activity in Germany and the Committee of Free Germany will play a leading role in this propaganda. When asked whether Moscow intends the "Free Germany Committee" to be their future puppet Government in Germany, they reply that no information to that effect has reached them. In any case, the text of the Manifesto speaks deliberately of the moral role of the refugees and prisoners of war and cites as an example the cases of Von Stein, Koenigsmann and Arnold, who during the campaign of 1912 joined the Russians and appealed to the German people, urging them to turn their

14.

arms against Napoleon.

Russians here also state that their much criticized reticence about their post-war plans is dictated mainly by military considerations. But there is no doubt that Russia's future claims will increase in proportion to their military successes. If the collapse of Germany occurs when the Russian troops are already on German soil, then Moscow intends to play a leading part in the negotiations over Germany's unconditional surrender and the establishment of a temporary regime in Germany.

\* \* \*

**SECRET**

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October 27, 1943

Memorandum for: General William J. Donovan  
From: G. Edward Buxton  
SUBJECT: Plan for Inducing Surrender of  
OAF Pilots

I have read the original "Special Plan to induce OAF Crews to Surrender Themselves and Their Planes" and Commander Hinks' comments. In addition I have talked with Commander Hinks.

I agree with him that any attempt to persuade German pilots to surrender their planes to the Allies will bear little fruit until the morale of the Luftwaffe is much lower than I believe it to be at present.

You will recall that in the last War the German Air Force maintained the highest enemy morale up to the day of the Armistice. I recall talking with two German pilots shot down by my Regiment on November 1st. They thought it was a good war and that they, themselves, were a superior brand of people and expressed nothing but contempt for ground forces.

-2-

SECRET

If I were the Commanding Officer of the Luftwaffe and learned of propaganda to bribe my pilots into surrendering their planes I think I could make the kind of an angry, scornful speech which would make the propaganda an asset for me instead of a liability.


I do not think that even toward the end of the War, providing German Air morale gets noticeably bad, that it would be good psychology to try to offer any money inducement for surrender.

I think the argument should be made on patriotic grounds -- in an endeavor to prove that the best service a loyal German can render his country would be:

A. To bring the war to a close before the last vestige of civilization is destroyed by bombs, and,

B. Helpless women and children slaughtered by the hundreds of thousands by this terrible and growing barrage.

NOTE: Louis Franck was in here today and said the English Services assert that the German air morale is now worse than the morale of the Army ground forces.





## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Brig. General William J. Donovan

DATE: 30 September 1943

FROM: Kenneth W. Hanks, Lt. Comdr. USNR

SUBJECT: Plan for Inducing Surrender of GAF Pilots

Some time ago you asked the Planning Staff to consider a proposed plan for inducing the surrender of GAF pilots.

After a study of the proposal the Planning Staff prepared and now recommends the attached plan which is premised upon the fundamentals:

(a) The pilot is provided a plausible excuse for surrendering to satisfy his sense of decency;

(b) When the bribe offer works on him it is not an offer made by the United States Government or armed forces. The pilot has fallen for a rumor.

The attached plan rejects three major proposals contained in the original plan submitted to us.

(a) A formal offer of United States citizenship.

It is doubtful if arrangements could be made to confer citizenship on this basis. An invitation for traitors of a temporary type to become citizens of the United States would bring public disapproval.

(b) A United States Government promise of a job in an American office after the war.

It is doubtful if this could be worked out under our immigration laws.

(c) A promise of cash payment for all articles of aviation and equipment delivered by the flyer.

- 2 -

SECRET

An open invitation to treason with a bribe as the main inducement seems to be too crude to be effective. Even under the greatest pressure most young men of the Air Force would need some patriotic justification for surrendering.

The original paper you referred to us is also attached. I should like to discuss these papers with you.

Attachments (2)

*Kenneth W. Hinkle*  
K. W. H.

11/12/47  
T. G. G. G.  
J. G. G. G.

## SPECIAL PLAN TO INDUCE GAF CREWS TO SURRENDER THEMSELVES AND THEIR PLANES

### STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

1. The primary purpose of this plan is to weaken the German airforce by inducing the surrender of fighter plane crews and planes. A secondary aim is to lower the morale of the German forces by arousing doubt about the loyalty of the airforce.

### DISCUSSION

2. German Aircraft Shortage. The German aircraft shortage is so acute and the existence of a large fighter air fleet for the protection of Germany is so much more vital now than ever before, because of the tremendous growth of the Allied airforces, that any appreciable reduction in this fleet will materially assist in shortening the war.

3. Declining Morale of the GAF. The morale of the GAF is still good, but not as high as it was in 1940. It is being shaken by:

- a. heavy losses in combat and on the ground;
- b. a change from numerical superiority to marked numerical inferiority;
- c. a change from an almost unopposed offensive to a defensive;
- d. German defeats on land and at sea;
- e. the recognition of their inability to prevent the destruction of German cities and industry from the air.

4. No Rational Problem of Surrender under Present Conditions. Fighter pilots would find it almost impossible to surrender at this time, no matter what the inducements.

a. An attempt by a German pilot to reach an Allied base or field would in most instances require crossing of the English Channel. Interceptors and AA fire would shoot to kill.

b. Surrender signals are impractical because of the danger of discovery.

c. A German pilot would be practically impossible for one to land in Germany or to return to England without being captured, or worse, or named as a traitor.

forces move north in Italy, and in the Balkans, and cross the Channel to fight in Western Europe, the physical problem of surrender will change materially. As combat zones are established in Western Europe, a German pilot will find it possible (a) to bail out; (b) to make a crash landing; or (c) to land with his plane undamaged. Since the purpose of the plan is to reduce the strength of the German fighter airforce, failure to get undamaged planes is not important.

6. Emotional Problems of Surrender. The emotional obstacles to surrender are (a) fear of ostracism as a traitor or a coward; (b) fear of reprisals on the flyer's family.

#### METHODS OF INDUCING SURRENDER

7. A Manifesto from German Flyers. The Russians apparently have been able to persuade German officers, including general officers, to issue a manifesto to the German people urging surrender. Apparently the fear of ostracism or reprisals was not strong enough to outweigh the reasons or inducements offered by the Russians. Several hundred German aviators are in Allied prison camps. Efforts should be made to persuade by means of tempting offers or otherwise some of these flyers to issue an appeal to German flyers to surrender. Even if efforts to persuade German aviators to sign such a manifesto proved unsuccessful, there is no reason why the manifesto shouldn't be issued anyway. We have the names and the aviators. Actually, there is a possibility that Russia did just that -- used names of captured officers to promote a Soviet plan, although recent developments lead to the belief that German officers actually are taking part in the committee's work. The appeal could be based on (a) the German cause is now hopeless; (b) prolonging the war is in the interests of the Japanese whose aim is Hirohito's rule over the whole world, including Germany; Japanese leaders never have distinguished between Germans and other non-Japanese in their determination to rule the world; (c) the future of western civilization is in the air. Good jobs for flyers will be plentiful after the war, but they won't profit. This manifesto would be given widespread circulation.

the same lines as in 7 above should be smuggled or dropped into German flying fields, this time using cartoons to emphasize the ridiculous situation into which they have been forced, as defenders of white civilization with a Japanese ally, and emphasizing that good flyers will be needed in the rebuilding of the western world after the war. The leaflet might hammer away at the folly of letting the leaders of the post-war world be killed off "in a futile gesture to help the Japs."

9. Rumors of Bribery. Rumors could be started that the Allies are offering German pilots the full value of their planes for surrender. Another rumor might explain that the money used for such payments came from a fund of \$50,000,000 that had been deposited by Goering and Goebbels in banks in two Latin American countries, and that the U.S. was keeping a watchful eye on another sum deposited by the same men in the Argentine. Because such reports would not come from any official source they would have little effect on most of the flyers, but they would be planned to attack neurotic, over-tired, discouraged pilots as the war goes more and more against Germany and as facilities for landing on Allied territory become more available. Other rumors: that jobs in the post-war air transportation field had been promised, that a pledge of non-discrimination in aviation jobs against German flyers who surrender had been given by high Government officials.

### CONCLUSIONS

1. That, if even a small number of German crews surrender themselves and their planes, Germany will be materially weakened because of its shortage of aircraft.

2. That the evidence of the weakening of the morale of German aircraft crews makes it likely that it may soon deteriorate to the point where it will be possible to induce a number of crews to surrender.

3. That regardless of whether an appreciable number of German aircraft crews surrender, reports of surrenders and offers of inducement to surrender at a time when the morale of German aviators is

of the GAF and lower still further its morale and public confidence in it.

#### LINES OF ACTION

1. To arrange for German aviation prisoners to send a manifesto as outlined in 7 above.

2. To get the cooperation of OWI and BBC for the proper broadcasting of the manifesto.

3. To prepare and send through black channels leaflets based on material outlined in 7 above as well as rumors of bribery and unusually good treatment accorded aviators who surrendered.



It is the right time to hit Germany by propaganda combined with war of nerves.

The Germans fear the power of U.S.A. and know and exaggerate rather than underestimate the industrial efficiency and possibilities of U.S.A. The average German is convinced that the defeat of Germany in 1918. was due to the American help only which decided the result of the war. They worship the American conditions of life and the great wave of German 'emigration in the years following the world war I. was prevented by the immigration laws only. These facts can be adequately used.

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The following course of events is proposed.

The Government of U.S.A. issues a proclamation to the members of the Luftwaffe inviting them to join the U.S.A. citizenship. The proclamation must be written in the right manner which would appeal to the peculiar structure of the German mentality. On the other hand the proclamation must be edited in phrases which include no contradictions to the existing laws regulating the acquisition of the U.S.A. citizenship. The proclamation will include the promise of inserting the man who joins U.S.A. in the official list of heavy wounded prisoners of war, further the promise of locating him for the duration of the war in well equipped and well fed prisoner of war camps. Furthermore the proclamation will include the promise of a job for the man in one of the American Air-lines after the war.

The proclamation must include the promise of cash payment for all articles of aviation and armaments which the man brings with him. The real value of the articles will be instantly paid in cash. An estimation of the amount of money which will be paid for the more popular objects ( planes, guns & ) has to be added to the pro-

SECRET

clamation. Especially chosen places in England will be enumerated where U.S.A. officials will be present to receive the incoming men. Obviously there must be chosen landing places which are adequately arranged to prevent a displeased visit of the Germans, counter-acting the effects of the proclamation. An agreed upon sign will be described which when given will inform the landing place that the newcomer comes in peaceful terms. It must be underlined that in U.S.A. exist no laws prohibiting the free movement of money.

After a landing really a check upon the sum due to the man is to be handed him. But conform to the law concerning the funds of enemy aliens only 500 dollar will <sup>be</sup> permitted to spend, the remaining money being transferred to a bank in U.S.A. <sup>It</sup> ~~and~~ will be at the disposal of the man ~~x~~ after he has arrived in U.S.A. Obviously exemptions in favor of the man will be possible. As a general rule the most generous manner in handling that part of the promise will be necessary. The informations reaching Germany must speak about the correctness of the U.S.A. officials.

The proclamation will, thus, show that a crew of an ennemy aircraft joining the proclamation not only saves her life, receives the security of a post-war job but, above that, may start the new life with a considerable amount of money.

The proclamation will be issued by B.B.C. and American short wave-broadcasting, will be printed and distributed in leaflets upon the enemy territory. Each day the sums which have been paid to the German aviators will be announced in the radio news, especially in those broadcasted to Germany.

( The German text of the proclamation is added separately.)

The results of the proclamation shall be enormous. In the rank and file of the German aviation a mistrust will take place which will



paralyze the free movement of the air force. The sending out of a single plane will be always full of risk. It would not be peculiar if finally special guarding planes would watch the landing places, send out by the Gestapo to prevent the escape of army fliers. In case that German planes would arrive and surrender the weakening of the German air force and the real gain in material for the American army will sufficiently compensate the money spend in connection of the action.

Details of the action are to be carefully elaborated.

# **Mitglieder der Luftwaffe !**

Die Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika richtet an Euch folgenden Aufruf !

Wir wissen dass Ihr tüchtige und mutige Leute seid - erstklassig als Fachleute, verlässlich als Menschen. Daher richten wir an Euch diesen Aufruf.

Amerika hat diesen Krieg nicht gewollt. Trotz heftiger Propaganda, welche Amerika in den Krieg ziehen wollte, die Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika hat die Neutralität gewahrt. Nun hat Deutschland an uns den Krieg erklärt. Die Weltgeschichte weiss, dass Amerika jeden Krieg bisher gewonnen hat und auch diesen Krieg wird es gewinnen. Der Versuch Deutschlands uns zu besiegen ist ganz aussichtslos. Das ist jedem nüchtern denkenden Menschen klar. Dieser Krieg wird durch Maschinen entschieden. Wir haben sofort unseren unübertroffenen Industriemassstab auf Krieg umgestellt. Wir haben das meiste Geld, die meisten Rohstoffe, die besten Fabriken, die geschicktesten Arbeiter. Unser Erfindergeist ist erstklassig. Wir können durch niemanden in der Welt übertroffen werden. Unser Sieg ist sicher. Präsident Roosevelt hat als erste Kriegslieferung folgende Waffen angeordnet:

Flugzeuge, Geschütze, Kriegsschiffe usw.usw.

Die Fabrikation ist in vollem Gange. Sollten diese Mengen nicht genügen, so werden weitere Bestellungen folgen. Die Kapazität unserer Fabriken ist unerschöpflich.

Die Lage Deutschlands ist hoffnungslos. Es spielt keine Rolle welche erfolgreichen Waffentaten die deutsche Armee in der Zwischenzeit ausfechten will. In dem Augenblick, wo unsere Kriegsvorbereitungen beendet sind, ist das Los Deutschlands besiegelt. Wie es im Jahre 1918, besiegelt war, als unsere Armee auf dem Schlachtfeld erschien. Es wird gar nicht notwendig sein unsere ganze geplante 10 Millionen Mann Armee ins Feld zu

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schicken.

Wir Amerikaner haben keinen Hass gegen Deutschland. Wir sind objektiv und haben es immer verstanden das Wertvolle in jedem Menschen zu schätzen. Millionen Deutscher haben im Laufe des Jahrhunderts zu uns ausgewandert und sind erstklassige Bürger Amerikas geworden, auf die wir stolz sind. Viele von ihnen sind ihrer Muttersprache treu geblieben und dabei opferfreudige Mitbürger der Vereinigten Staaten geworden. ~~Einige von ihnen~~ Die einen sind zu uns gekommen, weil sie den Absolutismus nicht vertragen konnten. Die anderen kamen, weil sie den Liberalismus nicht vertragen haben. Wir haben allen Gastfreundschaft angeboten und nur Dank geerntet. Das freie Leben in Amerika, die wirklich bestehende ungehinderte Möglichkeit für den Tüchtigen sich den ihm gebührenden Platz in der Gesellschaft zu erobern, der Reichtum an dem alle teilnehmen, die ungestörte Möglichkeit sich und seinen Kindern das Leben nach eigenen Wünschen einzurichten bringen es, dass der Bürger Amerikas, welcher Herkunft er auch sein mag, die Freiheiten Amerikas als des höchsten Gut seines Lebens schätzt und verteidigt. Das sind keine leeren Phrasen, sondern Tatsachen.

Wir sehen mit Trauer, wie dieser unheilvolle Krieg bloß nutzloses Verderben und Ruin bringt. Nutzlos für Deutschland, da es unmöglich den Krieg gewinnen kann. Das bodenlose Elend in welches das besiegte Deutschland gestürzt werden wird, ist masslos.

Wir sehen, wie Ihr nutzlos Euer Leben für eine verlorene Sache opfert. Euer Leben schätzen wir sehr hoch ein. Wir planen nach dem Krieg eine bisher noch nie dagewesene Entwicklung des zivilen Luftverkehrs. Unsere Fabriken, welche wir jetzt auf die Massenproduktion von Kriegsmaschinen eingestellt haben, werden nach dem Krieg Zehntausende von Flugzeugen monatlich produzieren. Wir wollen diese Produktion nach dem Kriege weiter beibehalten. Wir planen ein weltumspannendes Netz von Flugzeugverbindungen

3.

welches täglich von Tausenden von Post- und Passagierflugzeugen befliegen werden sollen. Dazu werden wir tüchtige, verlässliche Piloten brauchen. Je mehr desto besser, je tüchtiger, desto willkommener. Das ist unser Amerikanischer Grundsatz.

Wir laden Euch ein! Kommt zu uns! Jeder ist willkommen!

Risikiert nicht Euer junges, hoffnungsvolles Leben in einer verlorenen Sache! Wir verehren Euren Heldennut und Eure Opferfreudigkeit - aber wir haben kein Verständnis für nutzloses Sterben. Gesunder Menschenverstand befiehlt sich zu retten, wo nichts zu gewinnen ist.

Denkt die Sache gründlich durch. Euer Heldentod wird niemandem Nutzen bringen. Wenn Ihr weiterlebt und arbeitet werdet Ihr in der Lage sein nach dem Krieg vielleicht so manche Not in Deutschland zu lindern.

Wir, die Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, versprechen Ihnen hiermit, dass jedes Mitglied der Luftwaffe, welches sich freiwillig uns zur Verfügung stellt, nach dem Krieg eine seinen Kenntnissen und <sup>entsprechende</sup> seiner Tüchtigkeit/Anstellung in zivilen Flugdienst der Vereinigten Staaten erhält. Während der Dauer des Krieges, in Eurem und im Interesse Eurer Angehörigen, wird jeder im Verzeichnisse der schwerverwundet Gefangenen genommen geführt werden und in einem besonders gut eingerichteten und besonders gut gepflegten Kriegsgefangenenlager in der gesündesten Gegend Amerikas verbleiben.

Wir schlagen Euch sehr vor! Es ist uns gleich was wir für die Flugzeuge und Waffen zahlen. Bringt mit Euch ein Flugzeug, ein Kriegsaufklärer, Waffen und Ihr werdet dafür sofort in Bar in amerikanischen Dollars schnell den vollen Gegenwert erhalten. Bei uns gibt es keine Beschränkungen im Valutaverkehr. Ihr werdet in der Lage sein sofort über das Geld verfügen zu können.

Wir zahlen für:

4.

Um das Abwickeln der Geschäfte praktisch zu gestalten haben wir spezielle Landungsplätze in England eingerichtet. Sie sind zu finden

Das Flugfeld ist durch markiert. Wir bitten jedermann, der in friedlichen Absichten sich dem Flugplatz näher folgende Zeichen abzugeben, damit vom Grund aus nicht geschossen wird.

In jedem dieser Plätze sind amerikanische Beamte und amerikanische Zahlstellen eingerichtet. Sie können der besten Aufnahme und der kulantesten Abfertigung der Angelegenheit sicher sein.

Sollten Sie an einem anderen Ort landen, dann genügt es wenn Sie von den Behörden verlangen zum nächsten Amerikanischen Büro geführt zu werden. Die Behörden sind überall in England genau instruiert worden. Vergessen Sie aber nicht sofort ein genaues Inventar anzufertigen.

Wir erwarten Euch.. Auf Wiedersehen !

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/12 : CIA-RDP13X00001B000100230004-5



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clamation. Especially chosen places in England will be announced where U.S. officials will be present to receive the proclamation. Obviously there must be chosen landing places which are accessible by air to prevent a unpleasant visit of the Germans, causing the effects of the proclamation. An agreed upon sign will be described which when given will inform the landing place that the new war comes in peaceful terms. It must be understood that if there exist no laws prohibiting the free movement of money.

After a landing really a check upon the sum due to the war be handed him. But conform to the law concerning the use of money. It is only so far as it is permitted to spend the money and transferred to a bank in U.S.A. and will be to receive money. The money was arrived in U.S.A. through various channels. It is not possible. As a general rule the money will be transferred to a bank in U.S.A. and will be to receive money. The money was arrived in U.S.A. through various channels. It is not possible. As a general rule the money will be transferred to a bank in U.S.A. and will be to receive money.

The information that in Germany most speakers of the language of the U.S. will be possible. As a general rule the money will be transferred to a bank in U.S.A. and will be to receive money. The money was arrived in U.S.A. through various channels. It is not possible. As a general rule the money will be transferred to a bank in U.S.A. and will be to receive money.

Thus, now that a crew of an airplane from the U.S. has arrived in Germany, the American people will be able to see the effects of the proclamation. The money was arrived in U.S.A. through various channels. It is not possible. As a general rule the money will be transferred to a bank in U.S.A. and will be to receive money.

Now that a crew of an airplane from the U.S. has arrived in Germany, the American people will be able to see the effects of the proclamation. The money was arrived in U.S.A. through various channels. It is not possible. As a general rule the money will be transferred to a bank in U.S.A. and will be to receive money.

[illegible]



## MEMORANDUM

COMMENTS ON THE MOSCOW MANIFESTO TO GERMANY

On July 12 and 13 a Free German Committee had meetings in Moscow. On July 21 a manifesto to the German people was made public.

This Committee is built around the German section of the Comintern (Communist International) "in dissolution". Among its members are former Communist deputies of the Reichstag who have long played leading roles in the Executive and Presidium of the Comintern. There are a great-grandson of Bismarck, authors and a number of German officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers among its 33 signers. The Committee has been given Soviet press, radio, and other facilities.

The manifesto, a brilliantly drafted document, addresses itself in the popular front manner to the German people. It said, in substance, that if the German people proved in good time that they want to be free and eliminated Hitler, they could decide their own fate. The manifesto threatened that Anglo-American armies were at the gates of Europe and that Germany could not hold out much longer. After explaining that Germany must not perish, the manifesto declared that a military defeat would mean dismemberment and the end of Germany. Germany was then called upon to form a strong, impulsive democracy, having nothing in common with the Weimar

It should recall German armies to the Reich's frontiers, abandon conquests, and then embark on peace negotiations, thus placing Germany on an equal footing with other nations. The manifesto spoke of the restoration of private property, the punishment of the guilty, freedom of speech, right of assembly, and a number of other democratic privileges. Amnesty was promised for all Hitler adherents who renounced him in good time and joined the movement for Free Germany.

On August 8, PRAVDA, official Communist Party organ, reproved the U. S. and Great Britain for failure to observe their pledges to open a second front.

Official emanations from Moscow have revealed resentment over Anglo-American intentions to work out the peace settlement in Europe, hostility to any project for federation of small European states, and a determination to insist on the importance of Russia's role in the political future of the continent.

To prepare for the future, Soviet policy is being directed towards Hungary; Poland (with a Polish Committee built on the structure of the old Polish Section of the Comintern); the 8 committees of northern Iran; a revival of Pan-Slavism (which has been centered around the All-Slav Congress); special relations with Czechoslovakia; support of the Yugoslav Partisans; and, finally, the Free Germany movement.

The Free German manifesto was no spontaneous gesture. It was not mere repartee to the Roosevelt-Churchill Joint

message to the Italians. Stalin's speeches and a number of inspired articles and developments over the last nine months give a pattern. Between the Kremlin, the Politbureau and the Comintern there is political planning of the highest order; the manifesto and the studied grumbling over the second front reflect this planning.

#### Great Britain --

British policy towards Russia has undergone violent gyrations. In 1939 Great Britain hoped for a military alliance. During the Winter War (first Finno-Soviet conflict) Great Britain was on the verge of hostilities with Russia. After June 22, 1941, the Red Army became a priceless ally. Now, British thought is divided. The British people are warmly grateful to the Soviet Union. Churchill and many military leaders, on the other hand, feel mistrust and premonitions, while the influential Eden-Foreign Office line on Russia pursues the cautious way, that of realism. This realism is reminiscent of pre-Munich appeasement.

#### The United States --

The United States, attacked, seeks to win the war on the battlefield, in the air and on the seas. This policy has been compromised by new elements in the equation. The war has become more and more political; and in wars of coalitions the strains and stresses appear, either as defeat approaches --

this is already the case with the Axis, or when victory is in sight, which is now the case with Russia and her allies.

#### The Soviet Union --

Soviet policy is a continuation of traditional Russian policy but with new slogans, both quieting and alarming. Russian policy is, at the same time, isolationist and expansionist.

The Kremlin suspects the Western democracies of desiring a mutual "bleeding white" of Germany and Russia and wishing to impose an Anglo-American peace in terms of a cordons sanitaire. Wrangel, Denikin and Kolchak remain as near to the Russian memory as Wilson and Pershing stand to us.

Also, Bolshevik ideology enters the picture, as the bitter coating of the Russian pill. The Thirteenth Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and the VII Congress of the Comintern (1934 and 1935) gave the last official manifestations of the pattern of the proletarian revolution. These manifestations are, in adequate part, a matter of public record. They have never been repudiated. Comintern leaders, active in 1934 and 1935, are now leading the aggressive moves of Russian intervention into Europe. If it is argued that Russia has abandoned idealism and world revolution for nationalism, it is disquieting. To have the Comintern mechanism adroitly employed for Russian expansion, an expansion to which visible limits have not been placed, is

- 5 -

not reassuring.

Hitler in MEIN KAMPF and with threatening speeches warned the world of danger for years. Great Britain and France did not heed the warning. Soviet doctrine, too, is available to the student as a warning. So is Russian history. We know Germany now as the result of two costly wars. This is our second war as an ally of Russia. But we continue to be either emotional or confused when we consider the U.S.S.R.

To recapitulate:

The manifesto and Soviet complaints about the lack of a second front require analysis.

Although the Soviet Union is suffering grievously from a war unparalleled in casualties and destruction, the Soviet military situation is at this moment peculiarly favorable. Soviet complaints over the second front, therefore, do not stem from the same dire need for military success that existed a year ago.

The manifesto and its timing are, of course, primarily political. It is the opening gambit for a peace move. Our "failure" to open a second front could provide the alibi. The peace proposition conveyed to the Germans by the manifesto is an alternative to "unconditional surrender" that might be more attractive to many Germans. We, with "unconditional surrender", do not even give Germany an assurance of protection from the vengeance of the conquered peoples, an assurance

- 6 -

that is implicit in the Soviet proposal.

Field Marshal Kutuzov, who was commander-in-chief against Napoleon, is once again a national hero in Russia; a new Soviet decoration is named after him. He discovered in October, 1812, that it was better not to crush Napoleon since Russia's ally, England, would, he thought, be the only one to gain. His idea was simple, that Napoleon had learned his lesson; he would never again be a danger to Russia, and if he could reform his legions in France, he might then be able to cope with the British from whose iniquities Russia so long had suffered.

Marshal Stalin, like Marshal Kutuzov, may now think that Hitler will never again be a danger to Russia; that the Germans might be useful in curbing the iniquities of the English (and of the Americans, too), and that a MOSCOW-Berlin Axis might be the answer to the Kremlin's prayer (with, of course, the center of balance heavily in the East).

If Germany makes a deal with Moscow and withdraws to her frontiers, it must be noted that the Reich would be deprived of Russian oil, Balkan minerals and foodstuffs and would be completely encircled. Germany would then be subject to the full force of Soviet pressure. In other words, from the moment that such an agreement was carried out, Moscow could always exact anything desired of Berlin unless we and the British rushed to the aid of the Reich, which is unthinkable at this time.

- 7 -

A MOSCOW-Berlin Axis, notwithstanding war-weariness, would be more formidable than the Berlin-Rome alignment ever was. As a counterpoise, the British Isles would be inadequate. Our position would become unfavorable.

Soviet political planning is both daring and prudent. The Kremlin is as yet committed to nothing. The Free German trial balloon could be quietly abandoned, or the Free German Committee, and other committees, too, could become the spearhead of the new Europe.

#### American Policy --

American policy in this war is difficult to formulate. This is largely because it is so very simple. It is not adhesive to popular appeal or even understanding. This derives from the negative fact that the United States was in grave danger and was attacked. We did not go to war; war came to us. The United States desires only a relatively decent world without constant recurrence of military aggression, oppression and conquest. Each of these simple concepts may go astray if, in the process of defeating Germany, we are maneuvered into aiding and abetting the rape of large parts of Europe by another and singularly similar European power.

#### Conclusions:

The situation is still fluid. The present war has long been foreseen by the Communist Party. The methods of exploiting it have been carefully studied (vide State Department

- 13 -

archives). At present, we face the dangerous paradox of having our political authority on the Continent of Europe diminish while our military strength is notably ascendant. Attack from the air and the destruction of great German cities are wounding Germany. Now, only Russia has land armies to retrieve the fallen game.

Our position, namely, concentration on the military task of winning the war, must be re-interpreted politically. The Russians are not yet irrevocably committed to a line of policy; neither are the Germans. The British can be influenced if we adopt a strong and positive line. We have vast strength. If exerted politically, it can still save the United States from fighting a great and costly war merely to have achieved the intolerable end of permanent mobilization.

In this war both Germany and Russia have produced great military surprises. We must be fully prepared against political surprises equally enormous. If such a surprise should be a union of Russian imperialism with Comintern revolutionary techniques, joined with German military and economic competence, the result would be difficult to handle. Russian-German collaboration is not as fantastic as it sounds. Its roots go back to Bismarck, even to Frederick the Great. After Rapallo and again after the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement, there was effective German-Russian collaboration. Each country now has a military elite, each a great bureaucracy, industry is



- 9 -

managerial, and proletarianization is no stranger to the Reich; moreover, the Soviet system is more incompatible with Western democracy than with another totalitarian state. Thus, elements of affinity already exist between them. The hatreds of war in Europe pass quickly into history. Rapallo came soon after Brest Litovsk.

**Suggested Lines of Action:**

- (1) Formulate a clear-cut, long-term policy, comprising maximum and minimum peace aims.
- (2) Press the British into alignment.
- (3) Avert a situation where we might be impelled to "outbid" the Russians, or where Germany could play one ally off against the other.
- (4) Limit the doctrine of "unconditional surrender" to "Hitlerite Germany". Not matter how undesirable, it is made necessary by the fact that Mr. Stalin has already done this.
- (5) Expedite the setting up of a second front in as great force as possible - but in the Balkans, where it could best influence both the course of the war, diplomatic relations with the Kremlin, and the peace to come. True, a Balkan front is difficult; perhaps it is impossible. If so, we must, of course, give up the project, but if it is merely very difficult but not impossible, we must by all means set up the Balkan front. An invasion of France and the Lowlands

- 10 -

would give us no political authority in central and eastern Europe. Only a successful Anglo-American invasion of southeastern Europe can give us a real voice in the eventual peace settlement. To err on the side of supposed caution in reaching the historic decision on what to do now might store up the gravest dangers for the future.

(6) Keep Germany oriented to the West and prevent her turning East.

(7) Leave nothing undone to reassure the Kremlin of continuing Anglo-American support, political and economic, in a peace without conquest.

Such lines of action, if promptly, skillfully, and resolutely pursued, will save a situation which is rapidly turning bad. It is wrong to underestimate our strength or to overestimate that of our enemies and allies. We can and must win both the war and the peace.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'F. M.' or similar, written in a cursive style.

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

**OFFICE MEMORANDUM**

To: Gen. William J. Donovan

Date: August 11, 1943

From: Harry C. Rado *C. C. R*

Subject: National Committee of Free Germany

Attached please find

- 1) My memo to Mr. DeWitt Poole of July 30, 1943 with some of the attachments,
- 2) My memo to Mr. DeWitt Poole of July 31, 1943
- 3) My memo to Mr. DeWitt Poole of August 4, 1943
- 4) My memo to Mr. DeWitt Poole of August 5, 1943
- 5) My memo to Mr. Hughes of August 5, 1943

**SECRET**

**NOT TO BE ACCESSIONED**

Mr. DANIEL P. FOLEY

July 20, 1943

May 3, 1943

146841

I on every 3 had not enough time nor clerical help to put the information on the "Free Germany Movement" in Moscow in good shape. I think that you want it rather this way than to wait for an orderly report.

I have biographical information about the former German Communist members of the Reichstag and about the intellectuals. These Germans have been among the trusted Communists who, in one way or another, supported Moscow's policy in Germany. Only these Communists were allowed to escape to Russia after Hitler came to power.

Enclosed are attachments:

- 1) Biographical material
- 2) Article in "Wall Street Journal", July 20, 1943
- 3) Article in "New York Times", July 20, 1943
- 4) Observations about the "Free Germany" Manifesto by Paul Scheffer.

We will notice that in the "Scheffer" article a photo is reproduced of Heinrich von Hinkel. Underneath it says: "Courtesy of German-Americans". I have made efforts to find out about the German prisoners of war on the list but have not been successful up to now. But I thought that if the "German-Americans" had this old photo of the very young von Hinkel, they probably have more. I used a trick in finding out. A German who is often very helpful to me is an acquaintance of Felix Bonheim (editor of the German-American and a near-Communist). This man called up Bonheim about something and in a by-the-way said that most people here think that the list of the German war prisoners is all nonsense and that only the Communists are really on this business. Bonheim was indignant and said that the German-Americans had complete lists and photographs of almost all of them. He asked approval and made a date for Monday or Tuesday to visit Bonheim and have a look at the pictures himself.

I do not believe that my friends will be able to take these pictures with me. But it seems that the Russians prepared for the Communists who certainly will question the authenticity of these people and produce the German-Americans with proofs.

I have written that the German-Americans got this material from the Soviet Union. (A few months ago they had 100,000

- 2 -

German Luftwaffe which the Russians drop on the German soldiers.)

I have one more thing about Walter Ulbricht: On August 23, 1949, after the announcement of the Russian-German pact Ulbricht called on the German workers in Germany asking the German workers to stand with the Russian workers and fight together British imperialism.

A Russian correspondent who talked to me about the Manifesto for the German workers in that part of the statement published in the Soviet press, the punishment of all Nazis responsible for the war and the responsibility for all those Nazis who repent, and the German workers to stand with the Russian workers. He thinks that this is a very important statement within the German workers' movement.

According to the report about the reporting and the reactions in the German press, it does not look as if they had grasped the meaning of this report.

The Manifesto is a page from "Stimme Deutschland" in Moscow with short notes written by the writers Willi Brodel, Erich Weisert, Friedrich Wolf.

These writers were participants in the last war.

- 3 -

The Daily Report of the POC, July 28, 1945, page M 1, contains the Moscow broadcast to Germany about the formation of the "National Free Germany Committee".

The German war prisoners, signers of the Manifesto, are all quoted with their ranks and identification as to army units.

Hitler is called the only obstacle to peace. "Nobody will negotiate with him, ... but if the German people take heart before it is too late and prove by their deeds that they want to be a free people and are determined to free Germany from Hitler, then they will win the right to decide their own fate and to be recognized by the world."

To me this looks like an invitation by the Russians via the Committee to the German General Staff to get rid of Hitler.

But in reality I think that the announcement of this Committee (they have worked on it for a long time - i.e. a year ago they reported a meeting of German war prisoners from 125 prison camps in Moscow - and the publication of that phony Rheinfeld-Conference of the German underground a few months ago, were preparations for this Committee) was timed as a message to the British and the Americans.

I also think that the Russians possibly did not like "Jugos" and want us to know that if they are not in on military administration missions in Italy (European soil) they will go ahead with the realizations of their plans in Germany - a 'yellow-travellers' government, secretly led by a party cell.

WOLF, Friedrich

About 55, born in Stuttgart. He became a medical doctor. He joined the Socialist and later the Communist movement because of the experiences he had with social conditions in the homes of German proletarians who applied for his medical care. He started his literary work with a drama "Kolonne Hund" (column dog) dealing with an experiment of proletarians who tried to settle as colonists in the woodlands of Northern Germany. Then came his famous drama "Gynocauli" (gynocauli) a manifesto against the law forbidding abortion. At this time he was indicted himself as a physician practicing abortion but was acquitted. He then wrote the drama "Matrosen von Cattaro" (The sailors of Cattaro), a play about the mutinies in the Austrian-Hungarian Navy during the First World War, this drama has been performed in New York. Another drama "Maitang erwacht" (Maitang awakes) deals with the Chinese revolution and was performed in Berlin but had no great success.

After the rise of the Nazis to power, Wolf went to Switzerland, later into France. He wrote the drama Professor Manlock translated in English and French and dealing with the anti-semitic policy of the Third Reich. The Russians made a movie out of this play. During the Spanish civil war Wolf served as surgeon in the Loyalist Army, he visited Moscow and returned to France.

Arrested after the outbreak of the present war by the French authorities and put into a concentration camp. The Russian government made him a naturalized Russian citizen and obtained his liberation in the short time between the French capitulation and the outbreak of the

-2-

German-Russian war. He went to Moscow where he wrote a drama "Bourgeoisie" about the French revolution. He also published a novel "Drei an der Grenze" (Three at the borderline) about German underground and many short stories dealing with life in the Spanish civil war and in French concentration camps.



**HEINKE, Erich**

Born 1903 in Berlin. He became a member of the Socialist Youth movement and a radical pacifist. In the early twenties he started as cabaretist in the Lipais cabaret "Die Retorte", (the retort) and became quickly one of the most popular political song writers of Germany. His Communist leanings were well known but up to today it is not sure whether he became actually a member of the Communist Party. Most of his songs were published in German radical political weeklies. Many of his songs were put into music by the best of the modern German composers.

One of the best German actors and singers, Ernst Busch, specialized in Weinert's poems and the records made from his performances were sold in the thousands. After the arrival of the Nazis into power Weinert went first to the Sarre-territory, then into France. In 1940 he had great difficulties in obtaining a Russian visa, but finally his wife who lived in Moscow since 1935 succeeded in convincing the Russian authorities that Weinert was really true to the party line. He now serves the Russian propaganda in speaking to the German army and the German people over the radio, he has published many songs dealing with the life of German soldiers and workers enslaved by Hitler.

**ERICH E. ECKHART**

He was in his early fifties, was born in Saxony. He was one of the first organizers of the Communist Party in that country and became a member of the Saxony Diet. Later he was also elected to the German Reichstag to which he belonged up to 1933. In Saxony he passed for a "Versteher" (sophistic) i.e. an advocate for the party's right wing, but things changed completely when he was named secretary of the Communist Party for the district of Berlin in 1932.

He was a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party in Germany, and while there was no exact proof available, nobody in Germany who watched his activities did entertain the least doubt that he was also one of the CPW men in Germany. He was always the most vicious attacker of Democracy in Germany. As a member of the Communist Faction in the German Reichstag, he was frequently the speaker justifying the co-operation of the Communist Party in what the Nazis did, especially voting together with them against any bills designed to promote Democracy in Germany.

It was Eckhart who organized in 1932 the strike of the Berlin transportation workers together with the Nazis and who made, therefore, the collaboration with the Nazis acceptable to many Communist workers in the Reich's capital, a fact which contributed doubtlessly to the fluctuation between the Communist and the Nazi party which has been observed in the last years of the Weimar Republic. After the arrival of the Nazis into power Eckhart was sent into France as one of the representatives of the German Communist A. E. (Central Committee) in exile. He lived in France up to the outbreak of the Spanish civil war, went to Spain and became one of the heads of the Communist political machine which hampered the war

-2-

effort of the Spanish loyalists. For a short time back to France in 1938 Ulbricht continued the efforts for the creation of a Popular Front of German emigrants started by the Communists after a new and sudden change of tactics as early as 1935. After the failure of these efforts Ulbricht went to Moscow where he has lived since the outbreak of the war.

Ulbricht is a man without personality and without any ideas of his own. An opportunist and a climber, a liar, disloyal, the worst type of an official of the late Third International. He has arrogant manners, likes intrigue and has no regrets for personal convictions of other people. Ruthless in his methods he will certainly try to dominate the committee set up in Moscow.

**SEBASTIAN, Gustav**

Is in his late fifties, was born in Upper-Silesia and was a mine-venturer. He was active in the mine-workers' Trade Union and very popular with his colleagues in the coal mines of Upper-Silesia. His personal influence contributed very much to the fact that the majority of them joined the Communist movement and voted for the Communist and not for the Social-Democratic Party. The industrial district of Upper-Silesia was the only one in Germany in which the Communists were stronger than the Social-Democrats. In 1925-1928 Sebastian represented the electoral district of Upper-Silesia in the German Reichstag and was always at the head of the list of Communist candidates. Inside his party he had no special leanings and never opposed the official party-line. He is a good organizer but not a very intelligent man, just the typical and average Trade Union and Party official. After the arrival of the Nazis into power he escaped to Russia and lives in Moscow - since 1938.

**SEBASTIAN, Anton**

Born in Chemnitz, was a Trade Union official of the RGO (Rote Gewerkschafts-Organisation, the Communist Trade Unions). He is a former well-known craftsman in the building trade and never played a major political role in the Communist.

**ERICH THIERACKER**

In his middle sixties, born in Berlin and comes from the old German Social-Democrat Party. He was a cabinet maker and one of the leaders of the Trade Union of workers in the wood trade. An orthodox Marxist he became a friend of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht and created with them during the First World War, the revolutionary organization of the SPARTAKUS-LEAGUE, later the German Communist Party. In the early months of 1919 he was inclined to advocate the self-dissolution of that party and to join the Independent Socialist Party, but was persuaded by his Russian friends to stay on the official line. He became one of the secretaries of the Third International and up to 1933 he lived part of the year in Moscow. He was a Communist member of the German Reichstag and also the whip of the Communist Fraction of the Prussian Diet. He was always a member of the Z.K. (Central Committee) of the German Communist Party and although he passed for an advocate of the so-called "Verrechnen" (appeasement) policy, i.e. the policy of rapprochement with the Social-Democrats, he never dared to oppose strongly the official party line which considered the Social-Democrats as enemy number one.

He was the most faithful executor of the Russian policy against the Weimar Republic when the Russian Communist Party was trying through the German Communist Party to overthrow the German Weimar Republic in order to establish a Soviet dictatorship in Germany. He reached a climax of his activity in that respect in August 1931. During that year the Nazi Party in Germany negotiated a plebiscite and referendum to overthrow the Democratic regime in Prussia as represented by the Social Democratic Prime Minister, Otto Braun, and the Minister of the Interior, Carl Severing.

-2-

Wilhelm Pieck was primarily responsible for the Communist Party joining with the Nazis in that referendum, which policy resulted in the impossibility to organize a real defense of the Democratic regime in Prussia a year later when Herr von Papen and the military staged their coup d'etat on July 28, 1932 in Prussia.

He was also active in the Rote Hilfe (Red relief), an organization created in order to bring relief to the victims of political persecution. In 1933, after the arrest of Thaelmann, he became president of the R.H. and went to Moscow where he stayed up to today as representative of the German Communists in the Third International up to the dissolution of this organization. Although the official party leader, Pieck is too weak as to impose his personal ideas and politics and always inclined to bow to the dictates of the Kremlin.

**HERMANN BRENNER**

Is a South-German in his middle fifties, born in the country of Württemberg. In his youth he intended to become a Protestant minister, but influenced by radical social and political ideas, he preferred to choose the profession of a teacher. He became a primary schoolteacher in Württemberg and wrote at that time numerous political songs and poems. A gifted writer and speaker he was invited by the Communist leaders to join the party's headquarters in Berlin as specialist in educational and school questions. Member of the Reichstag for the electoral district of Württemberg from 1924-1933. Coming from a country of small farmers and always interested in village life, Brenner specialized in the problems of small peasants and farm hands. In 1933 he was appointed head of the Agrarian Department of the Communist Party and wrote many pamphlets and articles (in the Communist newspapers and other periodicals) about the questions of agrarian reform.

In 1934 he disagreed with the official party-line and advocated a more conciliatory policy and collaboration with the Social-Democrats in order to avert the growing danger of Nazism. The party leaders never forgave such an independent attitude, they removed Brenner from his office in the Agrarian Department and he had great difficulties in being recommended as a candidate for the Reichstag.

After the rise of the Nazis to power he went to Russia and was appointed as a research worker on the Agrarian Institute in Moscow. In 1935 he wrote a book about the conditions of life of the German peasants in the Third Reich, "Bauern unter dem Hakenkreuz" (peasants under the swastika). Brenner is the idealistic type of a Communist and was never admitted to the inner circle which decided upon the party's official tactics.

**FLORIN, Wilhelm**

Came from a Rhenish worker's family and was born in the Ruhr district. First a metal worker, he joined the Independent Socialist Party and became a Communist in 1922. A good speaker and organizer he became editor of one of the party's newspapers in the industrial region of the Rhineland and a member of the Reichstag for the electoral district of Düsseldorf (up to 1933). Always true to the official party line he was in 1931-1932, the representative of the German Communist Party in the Third International residing in Moscow. After a brief return to Germany he went back to Russia where he lived uninterruptedly since 1933. Florin is the type of the Communist official, an ardent and conscientious worker without any individual thoughts and ideas of his own.

He was a Communist Reichstag member, was active in an organization called "Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition" (Revolutionäre Gewerkschafts-Opposition), which was a sub-division of the Communist Party in Germany, organized in order to break up the Democratic Trade Union movement from within. The climax of his career was reached in 1932 when he conducted, together with the Nazis, a political strike of all transportation workers in Berlin, such as subway personnel, street-car conductors and the like, which was aimed at increasing the domestic difficulties of the Weimar Republic, a strike which was not recognized by the Democratic Transport Workers Union.



**HEINZ KILLI**

Born 1902 in Hamburg, son of a cigar-maker. He became a metal-worker and worked on the ship-building factories of Blohm and Voorn in Hamburg. He was active as a member of the Social-Democrat Youth movement and has been imprisoned in Imperial Germany for one year and a half. Just after the First World War he published his first novel "Maschinenfabrik H. und K.". He also published some stories about proletarian life, some of them re-printed in the collection "50 Erzähler des neuen Deutschland" (50 novelists of New Germany) which has been published by the Communist Malik-Verlag in Berlin. As a member of the Communist Party and prominent Communist writer Kroll has been put by the Nazis into a concentration camp where he stayed for one year. After his liberation he escaped from Germany, went into Denmark, then to Russia and then to France. In 1936 he published a pamphlet "Der Anti-faschist Edgar Andre vom Tode bedroht" (the anti-fascist E. A. in danger of his life), a manifesto in favor of the Communist official Edgar Andre of Hamburg who had been sentenced to death and was later executed by the Nazis. In 1937 he published a novel about German underground "Dein unbekannter Bruder" (your unknown brother) and a collection of stories under the title "Der Spion" (The Spy) and other stories.

He also wrote a novel about life in the concentration camps, "Die Prüfung" (The trial). In 1937 he became a soldier in the Spanish Republican Army. In 1938 he came back to Paris and showed in that time sharp criticisms against the official Communist policy. Nevertheless he went to Moscow where he became co-editor of the literary review "Das Wort" (The word) published in the German language. In Moscow

-2-

he published a new collection of stories, "Bekannte und Verwandte" (acquaintances and parents), stories dealing with the early times of German socialism. As Becker did Erdel became also an active propagandist of the Russian cause after the outbreak of the German-Russian war in 1941. He specialized in propaganda among the German prisoners of war and passed as one of the most efficient Russian radio propagandists. He used to address the members of the families of killed or captured German soldiers.

**BERNER, Johannes J.**

About 30, comes from Bavaria, is the son of a high-ranking judge in the former kingdom of Bavaria. Berner studied philology at the university of Munich and wrote already before the First World War poems against the regime of Imperial Germany. Those poems came out as a book in 1913 under the title, "Verfall und Triumph" (Decline and triumph). During the First World War he published several books of poems, such as "An Europa" (to Europe), around 1916 and "Verbruederung" (fraternization). All his poems showed the tendency of radical pacifism. His poem "An den Frieden" (To the peace) has been published on the first page of the magazine "Neue Jugend" (New Youth) in 1916. Berner belonged to the so-called Künstleropposition (opposition of artists) and was an exponent of the expressionistic style. After the war he published "Wiedichte fuer ein Volk" (poems addressed to a nation). At this time, 1919-1924, his poems were not only pacifist but also religious minded, his book of poems "Um Gott" (About the Lord) for instance.

Berner's poems have been published by the leading German publishing houses, Kurt Wolff in Munich and in Leipzig. After the death of Lenin, Berner started a new period of his writings with the little poem-book "Am Grab Lenin" (At Lenin's tomb). Now he became openly Communist. He published in these years two novels, the famous novel "Leviathan" directed against the capitalistic profiteers of the exploitation of poison gas. Around 1928 he published a novel with the title "Der einzig gerechte Krieg" (The only just war), he meant the war against Russia. Around 1930 he published new collections of his poems "Ein Mensch unserer Zeit" (a man of our times) and "Der griechische

-2-

Plan" (the great planning), poems to the praise of the Soviet-Union's industrial effort. In 1933 he went into Switzerland, then to Paris and to Moscow in 1935 where he became co-editor of the International Literature (German edition), a standard work created by the Russian Literary Academy.

In 1934 he published in Zurich a collection of stories under the title "Der veränderte Platz" (The place has changed), stories dealing with experiences of men under the Fascist and the Communist regimes. In Moscow he wrote many poems, for instance "Hymne auf einen Mann" and a collection of poems under the title "Deutschland ruft" (Germany calls you). Most of his poems of the last years show a certain humanism for Germany and deal with memories of his youth with the landscape of Southern Germany and so on. A radio drama "Schlacht um Moskau" (Battle for Moscow) has been broadcast in London in 1942. Bacher is the official poet of the Communist regime, he was always a fanatic of the official party line.

He is an opportunist and an intriguer, disloyal to his co-refugees and treated German warner refugees in Moscow very badly.

**AMMEL, Martha**

About 68, member of the German Reichstag (up to 1933), comes from the old German Social-Democrat Party of the time prior to First World War. Born in Berlin in a middle class family, she became a social worker. During the war she joined the **UNABHANGIGE SOZIAL-DEMOKRATISCHE PARTEI DEUTSCHLANDS** (Independent Social-Democrat Party) which under the leadership of Haase, Ledebur, Bernstein and Hilferding - opposed the "Burgfrieden" (truce) policy and the patriotic attitude of the official Social-Democrat Party and urged the German workers to claim for peace and to overthrow the Kaiser's government. After the war the Independent Socialist Party tried to maintain an intermediary position between the Social-Democrats and the newly created Communist Party. Together with the Austrian and the French Socialists, the Independents formed the so-called Second and half International opposing the viewpoints of the Third (Communist) and the Second (Social-Democrat) International. But the pressure of the Communists became too strong. In its annual congress in 1922 which had been held in Berlin, the party, after a great oratorical duel fought between the Russian emissary Kiselev and the leader of the party's right wing, Heinrich Hilferding, decided to dissolve itself. The majority of the delegates voted for the Third International, i.e. for joining the Communists, the minority, comprising, however, four-fifths of the members of the party's Reichstag's group, rejoined the old Social-Democrat Party.

Martha Ammel belonged to the minority of the parliamentarians who became Communists. For some years she was the head of the Communist Party's Women Department and also a member of the I. K.

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(Central or Executive Committee) of the German Communist Party. In the Reichstag she specialized in the questions of social welfare and used to explain the Communist viewpoint as to those questions when the Reichstag debated the Reich's annual budget. Personally of mild and rather conciliatory manners she had many friends in the other parties. As far as the internal discussions inside the Communist Party were concerned she had no special leanings and has been found always on the official party-line. She became also a secretary of the IAW (Internationale Arbeiter Hilfe i.e. International workers relief work). After the rise of the Nazis to power and the start of Hitler's regime of terror she fled to Russia and lived since 1933 in Moscow where she worked for several international Communist organizations.

### Observations about the "Free Germany" Manifesto from Moscow

The Manifesto takes it for granted that "Germany can attain peace ... and an equal footing with other nations ... provided the German people are in good time courageous enough and prove in deed that they want to be a free people." This is the basic thesis of the Committee condensed by the writer from the full text as radioed from Moscow and printed in the Daily Worker, of New York. Otherwise, the Committee points out with the greatest emphasis, disaster will befall Germany if the people do not act "in good time", i.e. at once.

In allowing the Committee to acquaint the German people with this alternative, Moscow may also wish to remind its Allies that the Soviet Union reserves the right of holding its own views concerning the procedure to be followed in regard to Germany after victory. (American sources in Moscow have made efforts to prevent the appearance of the German Committee as in no way related to the policies of the government, though they reported at the same time that extensive facilities have been given to the Committee to speak to Germany over the air. These are the same facilities that were used for many years in explaining the relationship between the Germans and the Soviet Government.)

"In good time" appears also in the following constitution: "The new government - as proposed by the Committee - means amnesty for all Hitler adherents who 'in good time' will renounce him and join the movement for a free Germany." This implies that whoever does not join the movement exposes himself to being treated afterwards as a Hitlerite.

The Manifesto is calculated to catch as many fishes as possible. Yet, it makes it quite clear that the future 'strong democratic' power will have nothing in common with the 'helpless Krimar regime'. The Soviets have taught the world to think of their regime as a "strong" democratic government. The adjective 'democratic' is thus open to almost any interpretation and can therefore satisfy German non-Communists and Communists alike. The Committee does not demand a Soviet constitution for Germany. At least for the time being it wishes to please everybody who might be an anti-Nazi in Germany.

The decisive words 'and an equal footing' do not appear in the messages of the United Front, probably in compliance to the wishes of the censor. And the correspondent of the New York Times, Alexander Werth, refers to the matter by saying that according to the Manifesto "... the overthrow of Adolf Hitler and the withdrawal of the German Army would automatically create conditions for the early conclusion of a peace as favorable as possible to Germany in its circumstances." This gives an impression that the Soviet Union and the United Front evidently wished to convey to the Germans. Thus, later on it says: "We know that sacrifices are indispensable." This would be an allusion to certain aspects of the peace conditions which would have to be imposed on a broken Germany. But that is left to the discretion of the Americans, probably intentionally, and the passage may also be interpreted to refer to the sacrifices to be made in fighting the Hitler regime.

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And this attitude confirms other indications that Moscow is not intent on a Communist Germany set up amidst the ruins of the war. The inheritance of Hitler will probably prove to be unbearable for any government following the catastrophe. Any government will be compromised by signing the peace treaty or the armistice after a defeat.

Moscow prefers to deal after the war for some time with a regime existing alone, perhaps very alone, in the proletarian type but not quite living up to it though being socialist more or less. For a full-fledged German Soviet State could insist on equal treatment and protection by the "uninvited" in Moscow, while a regime in the manner of the Caucasian Socialist Republic that lived precariously for some years after 1917 next door to the Bolshevik Soviet Union, from which it differed by some fine points of doctrine and then was thrown out, would have to make every effort to be on good terms with the Soviets. Its existence would almost completely depend on their benevolence, not only internationally but also as far as the inner-political situation is concerned.

It cannot be overlooked that the principal demand of the Manifesto, immediate results, cannot be fulfilled by the German people - save, perhaps, at the moment when Germany cracks up. But then it will be too late; there will be no time left for a new government to take those remedying measures the Manifesto recommends.

It nevertheless serves well the purposes of Moscow. It confuses the Germans. It gives a rallying point against the Nazis to the army and the homefront, centering in the East. Such a center can be created only from abroad. The wording of the Manifesto is such that almost all strata of the German population will be induced to give some thought to it for it offers some kind of hope. The Manifesto is undoubtedly inspired by the Kremlin from beginning to end. It proves that the Soviets are resolved to get Germany in their hands.

After the event Moscow can point out that it gave good counsel "in good time" and all this will work in favor of the Communist party in Germany out of the present leadership in Moscow, the Committee for "Free Germany". Moscow claims it is time to jockey for a good position in the coming struggle for influence in Germany. On the strength of the Manifesto it will insist after the defeat that the cowardice and lethargy of the German people blocked the only way of action that could have saved Germany. Many people will believe them in retrospect.

The Committee is composed of a number of well-known members of the communist fraction of the Reichstag, as its nucleus and sugar-coated by the mass of non-party prisoners of war. The name of Lieutenant Gust Hainrich has attracted much attention. The Great War has also produced soldiers, some of them misanthropes, who became radical or ultra-radical. For example Gust Hainrich, General v. Baumbach and Captain v. Baumbach. The relatively great number of professional officers and non-commissioned officers of the Reichstag are refugees from the party and political movements with them. Johannes Becker is



well-known. They are all Communist of the middle class or Social Democratic. None of these layers of the population were certainly could have been found. understood by the party members in Germany well enough to grasp the tactical meaning of the test. (Press telegrams from Moscow have omitted to mention the membership of the "deputies of the Reichstag" in the Communist Party.

Walter Ulbricht is chairman of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party (shifted to Moscow) and since 1933 has broadcast on various occasions to Germany. These data are gathered from Sturmhilf, "The Tragedy of European Labor", New York, 1945. Part of one of the Ulbricht articles is reprinted there. It has a bearing on the topic of this memorandum inasmuch as he refers in the article "not only to Communist but also many Social Democratic and National Socialist workers" as supporting a certain attitude he takes himself. This shows that he and his friends in Moscow have adopted the policy already for some time to take National Socialist workers as their potential friends, at least as quite acceptable backers of their views. This is quite the opposite of the absolute intolerance they practiced before 1933. Whoever was not wholly with them was considered an enemy. They now try to manoeuvre on as large a platform as possible trusting that this is the best policy to win over the bewildered and wavering masses of Germany.

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Mr. Dwight Poole

July 31, 1943

Harry G. Rabe

Attached is the article from The Worker of August 1, 1943. The quotations from the article in "Das Schweigen Karpis" sounded very familiar to me, because I came across that article in July, 1941. I had a quick translation made and gave it to General Gurnea. At that time it seemed to me to show a significant change from the paper which had been most viciously anti-American. It had a change of heart. At that time it would have seemed that the Germans had some explaining to do at least why they had not been more successful on the Russian front.

The fact that the Light-Curtain-New in Moscow cabled Washington from this article to the United States now, calling that paper (German newspaper) was seems to me another indication that the Germans are carrying on Psychological Warfare against us. Showing that the relations between Russia and Germany might not be so bad as the news shows. Especially as this cable follows the spirit of the "Free German National Committee".

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Mr. INSIST Fuchs

August 4, 1943

Aug 4, 1943

Here are a few additional items concerning the Free German National Committee in Moscow.

Ernst Thiele was a young Swiss Nationalist in Hamburg with Communist connections. When Hitler came to power, he fled to Prague. From Prague he went to Spain and joined the Loyalists. This is the last time he has been heard of. From there he must have gone to Russia.

Dr. Friedrich Wolf was in Moscow at the outbreak of the war in 1939. He was informed with a lot of other Germans. A few days afterward he was released because the Russian Consul brought him Russian citizenship papers to the camp. The Russians never did such things for just nice people. They must have had a special interest in Wolf. My impression is that Wolf gave the impression of being a functionary.

I go into these details only because I think we must be clear in our mind about "The Committee is dead. Long live the Committee." The committee has not yet been reformed, the same people with the same members.

I have been puzzled by the statement the New York Times correspondent Alexander March has been making. I heard that he used to be correspondent for the Rochester Courier. He was not one of my courses in Paris in 1934-35. Is that the March who is a fellow-traveler?

March was born in Russia, probably of Baltic origin, speaks German very well. He wrote a book "Russia Story". I am told that it is worthwhile to read the last two pages of the book. (Have not done so yet).

So now I think about the members of the Free German Committee, the 100 members. They are scattered all over the world. They do not know each other. They are in the hands of Moscow. They have to stick to the "Communist line". The Russian General Staff and the more reliable members of the German camp know that their chances for winning the war are slim. They may have the chance of choosing to whom

to support. The Germans probably did not intend to win the war. They might doubt that the Russians

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- 2 -

NOT TO BE ACCESSIBLE

will be keeping their word, but there is a chance of it.

There always were sympathies in the German army for alliance with Russia. Through ten years of Nazism and war lots of people in the army have been radicalized. For a great many of them the step would not be hard to give themselves up to Russia in the hope of becoming an ally. The people in the SA, the Party, the Gestapo have no chances with the British and us. They might think, and maybe rightfully, that the Russians will not touch their organizations, so their weight would be thrown in favor of giving up to Russia.

I saw a notice in a paper the other day that General von Blaskowitz has been named German commander in Italy. If that were so, it would be interesting. You remember, he is the one who protested against the circumstances in Poland in the Winter of 1939/40 and fell in disgrace. If he has been re-instated right now, it seems probable that he is being backed up. He belongs to that clique of opposition to which Weissenhofer also belongs. Weissenhofer is a friend of Blaskowitz, and he is also in Italy (Vallone).

I can see a division in the German General Staff about the question: to what to give up? A road may develop. If the Russians through the Free Germans back up the proposal, get rid of Hitler and you are welcome, and we do absolutely nothing, then the Germans will decide that we either did not understand this Russian move or that we have nothing to say.

I have read the Manifesto many times and I am amazed how clear this document really is. The fact that they bring in the Weimar Republic and mention that this is not the kind of government the Free Germans have in mind is an indication that they think it important to discredit the Weimar regime.

Personally I have come to the conclusion that the body of organized labor in Germany and the Christian Unions, all labor organizations outside the Reichsvereinigung, are going to be the most important organized groups through which to fight the Communist danger in Germany. It has always been that way: successful when the Social Democrats fought the Communists then when the Nazis did it. I have seen too many times the extreme left and the extreme right in European countries get together.

This weakening of the Weimar regime in the Manifesto seems to me good and the Russians know where their potential enemies against a possible or future-candidate German regime are.



August 8, 1943

Mr. William Fuchs

Harry C. Smith

National Committee of Free Germany

X47/44

You may be interested to hear what a private from Camp Mitchell, Md. told me about the reaction in the entire camp when the National Committee of Free Germany was learned about.

The news was taken extremely seriously right away and the general attitude is that there is a real danger and that something should be done about it.

Camp Mitchell is an Intelligence Camp where officers and men, about 60% of them refugees, are being trained in special intelligence work.

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## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Hughes

Date: August 5, 1945

From: Emy C. Rado

Subject:

Here is my report on my telephone conversation with Mr. Poole on August 3, 1945 re: Graf Heinrich v. Kinsiedel and the article in the New York Times by Mr. Eugene Tillinger on Sunday, August 1, 1945:

- 1) Mr. Tillinger, an Austrian who collects items from all German language newspapers and has quite a file for journalistic purposes, received the picture of Kinsiedel and a copy of the leaflet which was written by Kinsiedel and dropped by the Russians over the German army already in April 1945. The leaflet was dated November 1943.

Mr. Tillinger does not want to disclose the source. I am told that he got it from a man in a Russian trading firm, probably one who is distributing Russian films in Canada.

- 2) The German-American got the photos of the participants of the conference from the Tass Agency. The editors of the German-American have received the stenographic report of the whole conference of July 12, 1945. The report is too long for their monthly paper, so they have decided to print pamphlets and distribute them to their friends. I am sure to get two copies and will forward them to you.

*SECRET*  
*Approved in (1944)*  
*x Plan*  
*100 1*

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
11 August 1945

Lt. Patrick Delan

Edmond L. Taylor

I am passing on to you the attached project for a special MO campaign in Germany worked out by Dr. Hamilton and other members of my staff. If it is possible to obtain the support of PWE and the official American and British radio I think the campaign might achieve some really worthwhile results. If you find it interesting I suggest that the first step should be to consult with the PWE representatives here about it.

cc: Gen. Donovan



**SECRET**

**PROJECT FOR MOBILIZING AN OPPOSITION MOVEMENT  
WITHIN GERMANY**

**Objectives:**

1. To make individual passive anti-Nazis throughout Germany band together in small, active opposition groups.
2. To make such local groups believe they are parts of a large national opposition movement.
3. To integrate and extend these groups by internal and external communication.
4. To induce these groups to carry out, in organized fashion, passive resistance, simple sabotage, and eventually active resistance and major sabotage.
5. To accomplish the above objectives within the framework of:  
(a) high Anglo-American policy, (b) operations which are feasible at the present time, and (c) the attitudes, motives and policy controls current in Germany.

**Situation:**

The present status of the war calls for the immediate utilization of PW to create a large-scale opposition movement in Germany.

If the Present Nazi government stays in power for the next 12 months and defends every barrier to Germany, invasion will take a heavy toll in Allied casualties. This toll could be greatly reduced if an active, widespread opposition movement were launched at once.

Such a movement would compel the Nazi government to pin down troops



in Germany for Internal security instead of using them on invasion fronts. Thus it would be an indirect but important aid to our own armed forces.

Present and planned Anglo-American PW activities are not likely to produce such a movement within Germany. (See Appendix I). However, such a movement could be instigated if the existing weapons of PW were manipulated in a new and unorthodox manner, to be described herein.

The Russians have taken the initiative in PW against Germany with their National Committee for Free Germany. It is not likely that Anglo-American policy will be directed toward complete cooperation with this committee. The method which is to be proposed does not directly conflict with the Russian line, but its direction and implements are strictly Anglo-American.

The proposal assumes that there are large numbers of Germans who are passively opposed to the Nazis. These Germans have cooperated with the German war effort through fear of persecution. Now they realize defeat is likely and they feel themselves caught in the same trap as their rulers, thereby increasing their antipathy toward the Nazis.

These Germans (hereinafter referred to as the Target Group) have now no collective means of expressing their anti-Nazi feelings. Furthermore, they have no reason to believe that individual acts of opposition will be recognized by the Allies and will result in preferential treatment.

High policy is committed to unconditional surrender, and is opposed to specific promises regarding post-war arrangements. The validity of this policy does make it difficult to incite successfully the non-Nazi Germans to organization, resistance and sabotage by direct and official plans.

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Therefore, this proposal urges the use of the unofficial, indirect methods of IW to instigate an anti-Nazi movement which will appear indigenous to Germany. In a nutshell: to incite a movement from without which will seem to originate from within.

Such a movement must have characteristics which will persuade potential members that they will receive preferential treatment, as distinguished from Nazi criminals. Furthermore, the movement must involve a minimum personal risk, at least in the early stages, if large numbers of persons are to be induced to join. The method proposed for instigating such a movement is briefly this: by an intensive use of rumors and black radio spread the story that small groups of anti-Nazis throughout Germany are signing dated secret documents which commit them to opposition to the regime. They are doing so (rumors will say) because they anticipate that these documents will be respected by the Allies as proof of trustworthiness, and that their signers will receive preferential treatment.\*

This intensive campaign, if properly executed, will induce small groups of from 3 to 5 persons, believing that a national movement is afoot, to actually get together and sign such secret documents. At first, these groups will be composed of persons intimately known to each other, one or more of whom will have learned of the "movement" through rumor or forbidden sources.

The above-mentioned documents will have to be definitely and validly dated, so as to prevent Nazi opportunists from signing them after defeat and forging an earlier date. This problem will be solved by spreading

\* (21 August 2, 1943), Elmer Davis, Director of the United States Office of War Information, spoke to Germany from Algiers, stating, "If there still are Germans who love freedom...let them show their feelings by actions in this."

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the work that the "document" in use is a dated sheet from a current newspaper, upon which signatures and commitments are inscribed. (See Appendix III).

Details regarding the further development of the movement, methods of proselyting new members, methods for excluding Nazis and opportunists; methods for securing records of the behavior of Nazi criminals and their collaborators, methods for developing communication between nuclei of the movement and the outside; methods for manipulating the movement toward increasingly aggressive acts of passive resistance, active resistance, simple sabotage; and major sabotage; and methods for utilizing the movement after invasion will be found in Appendices IV, V, VI, VII ----

The instruments by which the movement would be instigated may be mentioned briefly (See Appendix VI for Schedule). The first steps would be taken by MD and FWE as indicated above, according to a carefully overdictated schedule. Shortly thereafter, in neutral press dispatches, rumors of the movement, as printed, would be filtered back to London and Washington, whence they would be reported as straight news over official radies. New developments in, and outcroppings of, the movement would be continually reported, as were manifestations of the "W" and "1918" symbols. Somewhat later, a Freedom Station ostensibly operated by document signers in Germany would take over specific direction of the movement. By utilizing all available media in a vigorous and coordinated manner, the Target Group could be made rapidly aware of the details of the movement. Extension and manipulation of the movement can be accomplished by the same means employed to instigate it.

7 August 1943

**SECRET**APPENDIX I**Potentialities of Present and Planned PW Activities for Rapidly Instigating an Opposition Movement in Germany**

The Official Radios of the United States and Great Britain capitalize on their reputation for honest and factual reporting of news. Official radios operate within a framework of high policy which prescribes that unconditional surrender must precede cessation of hostilities. Furthermore, while criminal prosecution and justice are promised for the Nazis, there can be no specific promises regarding post-war arrangements or regarding treatment to be accorded the German people. The white radio has relied almost entirely on exhortation without offering an organized plan in its attempts to induce popular revolt against the Nazis. The official radio has not been and could not be the prime mover in a campaign in which there was a definite or implied promise of preferential treatment.

Black Radio is of course not bound by official policy, but severe penalties for listening tend to restrict the size of its audience. clandestine stations, posing as the voice of dissident Germans, have repeatedly urged revolt. But they have not to date achieved the organization of a large-scale, organized opposition. It is unlikely that they can do so unless their efforts are part of a focal campaign in which other media are integrated.

Radio Leaflets suffer the same limitations as official radio. Black Leaflets cannot be relied on exclusively because of the tremendous obstacles to smuggling them in and because their audience is relatively small.

Radio emanating from neutral countries would be a most effective

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means of starting the movement and introducing new developments. But unsupported by other media, rumors would have a readily limited circulation and would eventually disappear, or might become hopelessly distorted.

The potentialities of Secret Agents may be considered, although there are almost insurmountable difficulties in the way of introducing any considerable number of them into Germany. Assuming that some agents can and will be introduced, it must be expected that their activities for some time will be confined to intelligence operations, sabotage, and possible organization work with a most restricted underground.

The range of Political Maneuvers which are feasible and acceptable is equally limited. Such maneuvers ordinarily involve negotiation with influential leaders rather than with the people. Since there is now no large opposition movement in Germany, there is obviously no leadership with which arrangements can be made.

The United States and Britain will lose much face, and might risk loss of a controlled post-war world, if they compromise the conditions laid down at Casablanca. In North Africa, and possibly also in Italy, there may have been groups sufficiently outside the totalitarian structure to justify negotiations. In Germany, negotiations would involve a compromise with the Nazis and/or the Wehrmacht. It is assumed that compromise with either of these groups is to be avoided.

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Examination of present PW weapons indicates that no single one of them is capable of effectively and rapidly establishing a large opposition movement in Germany. However, it is believed that individual limitations can be overcome if they are employed in the coordinated manner described in this Project.

**SECRET**APPENDIX IIPSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITY OF THE TARGET GROUP

Paradoxical as it may seem, the most outstanding characteristic of the Target Group is that it is not a group at all. It consists of a large — perhaps unbelievably large — number of individuals, each of whom secretly and fearfully guards his own opinions, attitudes and desires. Each person may have a very few intimate friends with whom he frankly discusses the misfortunes of Germany; toward the rest of his acquaintances and countrymen he maintains the illusion of faith in the Nazis and in Germany. Any other form of behavior would court persecution by the Gestapo.

Members of the Target Group are, therefore, psychologically isolated. The fact of this isolation inevitably leads to submissive behavior, particularly with respect to the Nazis.

Psychologists who have studied the behavior of groups, and especially those groups which are dynamic and active, agree that group-membership exerts a tremendous influence upon self-confidence and self-assertiveness. Persons in mobs and crowds, or even in ordinary clubs and secret societies acquire a feeling of power and a relaxation of inhibitions which permits and impels them to engage in actions which would not otherwise be undertaken.

The anticipated transformation of the Target Group from isolated passive individuals to active opponents of the Nazis is based on giving individuals and small groups or units the feeling that they are a part of a vast movement. True, this requires closely coordinated action on the

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- 2 -

part of all PW media, but it is not impossible. The greatest factor of advantage is that the Target Group is ready and waiting -- perhaps praying -- for the opportunity which is to be offered to them.

The first actions which the Target Group are to undertake deserve attention. From time to time, official and black radios have exhorted their listeners to "rise, and throw out the Nazi tyrants!" Such exhortations usually fall on deaf ears. They fail because the specific lines of action indicated are beyond the capability of the listener. The Target Group is unprepared, materially and psychologically, to overthrow the Nazis or even to blow up a bridge.

The ordinary person does not plunge indiscriminately into new and dangerous ventures. He approaches them gradually, and by degrees, and gains confidence and experience as he proceeds.

The present Project inducts the individual into the movement by requiring, at first, a simple and reasonably safe action, the execution of a document with a small group of his close friends. Once committed, and believing that he is part of a large movement, he is gradually induced to engage in more overt acts.

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APPENDIX IIITHE DOCUMENT: DISCUSSION AND DETAILS

The focal point of the entire Project is the Document. It is by means of the document that passively cooperating Germans signify their aversion to the Nazi regime and their willingness to incur at least some risk to oppose that regime.

There are two primary reasons which will impel the individual German to sign the document. The first reason is on an ideological level. The document provides him with an opportunity to express his disapproval of the Nazis and his desire to undertake any reasonable action which will speed their downfall and the cessation of hostilities. The feeling that he is a part of a large popular movement which is sweeping Germany, provides additional ideological and psychological impetus. (See Appendix II)

The second reason is eminently practical, and is related to self-interest. The target Group individual wants to escape from the situation into which Nazi machinations and belligerency have plunged him. He wants to set himself apart from those who deserve punishment, and he wants to establish himself as a candidate for preferential treatment by the Allies.

The document, therefore, must appeal to him as reasonably valid evidence to justify preferential treatment. He has every reason to anticipate that the Nazis will discard their insignia and submerge themselves in the mass of the German population, as soon as they decide that their cause is lost. He will anticipate that the Nazis, at that time, would be the first to denounce their party, and that they would forge or pre-date documents of



- 2 -

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documentation, if this seemed feasible.

The Target Group individual, therefore, needs evidence that his commitment was executed on a definite date. This evidence can only be provided by utilizing, as a basis for the document, a paper which is unequivocally dated. The best, and perhaps the only solution to this requirement is to use a sheet from a daily newspaper. Ease of procurement further recommends this method. (For a detailed consideration of objections to this method, See Appendix VIII)

The exact form in which the document is to be executed need not be too rigidly set up. In some cases, participants will feel that their hiding places are sufficiently secure to justify writing and signing their pledges in a normal manner. If security is precarious, the document could be signed by initials or code initials. Even greater safety could be obtained by scratching or pinpricking special letters to represent each participant. If each participant wishes to have a copy, pinpricking of superimposed sheets could be resorted to.

The exact methods used to execute the documents is relatively unimportant. The media used to disseminate the movement can mention several methods, and the participants can be left to select the method which is appropriate to their situation.

Suggestions regarding the hiding of documents may be disseminated, although it may be assumed that most Germans have given thought to such matters. One suggestion would be documents be sealed in envelopes, paraffined and buried.

The number of persons who execute a single document, and thereby become a nucleus in the movement, need not be definitely prescribed. It would seem,

- 3 -

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however, that the minimum number should be three. If the number exceeds five, security may be prejudiced.

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APPENDIX IVCOMMUNICATIONS

The orthodox underground movement, from its inception, is entirely dependent on communications. The most elaborate means for transmitting messages between agents and cells must be set up and maintained. This network is one of the most vulnerable features of the underground, for when messages are intercepted or when vital links in the chain are disrupted, the effectiveness of the entire underground is undermined.

The present Project is much less dependent on communications, particularly in its early stages of development. The separate units will develop more or less independently along lines indicated by PW media, and the relative autonomy of these units will be their greatest asset from the standpoint of security. However, a small amount of intercommunication between units will develop as a result of proselyting, when a given individual will have membership in two or more units.

The first simple overt activities, such as the compilation of indictments of Nazis and collaborators, can be instigated by PW media, especially radio.

After the movement has become established, more definite means of communication can be established according to need. Recognition words, and commonplace words having special connotations, can be disseminated. Special lines of liaison within a given area can be arranged locally for the dissemination of instructions received by radio or other means. Signals for general uprisings or other forms of concerted action may be given out

- 2 -

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as the need arises. Eventually, it may be feasible and desirable to introduce agents from the outside to establish contact with the already-established movement.

It must be recognized that the looseness of the movement's organization is at once its strength and its vulnerability. Just as an underground is occasionally penetrated, so will this movement be penetrated, and with greater ease. While penetration of an underground may spell disaster, penetration of one or more units of the projected movement should have no more than a local effect. Subsequent plans for increasing communication facilities or for consolidating the organization of the movement should be evaluated with these matters in mind.

APPENDIX V

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TERMINOLOGY

Any movement which represents or requires the concerted thoughts and actions of a large number of people requires a name and usually a prescribed terminology. When persons undertake specified acts which signify affiliation with any group, these acts almost invariably become meaningful in terms of specified words.

This appendix does not presume to be the final work in terminology; it is presented only as an outline of some of the considerations which German language experts should keep in mind in selecting a terminology.

Although the movement is directed against the Nazis, it is probably inadvisable to label it anti-Nazi. Should a coup d'etat result in the supplanting of the Nazi party by another dictatorial group, the name of the movement would have to be changed. Furthermore, a name which implies a positive goal, or a neutral name with positive implications, may be preferred.

Care should be taken to avoid names which already have special significance. Freiheit is a much-used word, and it has current significance in connection with the Russian Freedom Committee. The term Front der ~~germanischen~~ Deutschen has been suggested but it may have been used prior to the formulation of this Project. The possibility that a special meaning has been established for this title, and the implications of the word Front should be evaluated carefully.

The use of a new and relatively neutral term which has special current significance might be of value. If the Project is launched

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Immediately, Hamburger Bewegung would be particularly effective.

The name of the movement should emphasize its indigenous source. The name of a German city, as suggested above, would accomplish this.

Auxiliary terms which suggest the particular activities or instrumentalities of the movement might be desirable. Such words as Leitung, and Unterschiedler, and the prefix Zeitung --- should be considered.

**SECRET**APPENDIX VISchedule

The following is a tentative schedule for launching and developing the Project. For the sake of convenience, the date sequence of PW maneuvers is indicated with reference to the date on which the project is launched (L-day). It is not intended that this schedule will be adhered too rigidly. Modifications would certainly have to be made according to the way in which the campaign develops.

L to L+10

MO agents in neutral countries will disseminate piecemeal information regarding a new and mysterious opposition movement which is developing in Germany. The movement may be said to have started among refugees from Hamburg who blamed the Nazis for the loss of their homes, and for the continuation of a futile war.

MO agents should be warned to use only the most secure media of dissemination, since it is particularly important to avoid betrayal of Anglo-American influences at this stage of the Project.

L+11 to L+17

Neutral Official radios will refer to broad reports from the neutral press concerning an opposition movement in Germany. Such reports will actually appear in neutral papers, "bought" by MO and PWE.

L+17 to L+20

Whenever and wherever plausibility and absolute security permit, MO will continue to disseminate more and more specific information

SECRET

- 2 -

regarding the geographic spread of the movement and the method of demonstration.

Meanwhile, a black radio campaign will be initiated to supplement and corroborate the dissemination of rumors.

1/4/42 to 1/4/42

Official radio will quote more detailed accounts from the neutral press.

1/4/42

Official radio will come out with a story which will tie up with Elmer Davis' statement of August 2, from Algiers. Suggested text as follows:

Speaking from Algiers on August 2, Elmer Davis, Director of the United States Office of War Information addressed the people of Germany as follows: "If there are still Germans who love freedom -- not freedom to tyrannize over others at home and abroad, but freedom of thought and the right to speak out like free men -- if there are Germans who feel that way, let them show their feelings by actions in time."

Apparently Mr. Davis' warning is being heeded. Numerous reports indicate that an anti-Nazi movement, which originated in Hamburg a few weeks ago, is now spreading rapidly throughout Germany. In many centres, small groups of from three to five persons are reported to be meeting secretly in order to circulate documents which signify their opposition to the Nazis. As the date of the meeting is of such prime importance, the opposition pledges are being inscribed on current daily newspapers.

1/4/42 to 1/4/42

NO will continue to stimulate discussion of the movement, referring to it as the "Hamburger Bewegung". Editorial and other discussion of the possibility of receiving preferential treatment should be stimulated and posted.



SECRET

- 3 -

1/11

Official radio will come into possession of a statement written on a Hamburger newspaper dated 1-5, presumably smuggled out of Germany by a member who wished to publicize the movement. The document will be signed by three men and will state: "The undersigned solemnly pledge to devote themselves to the overthrow of the Nazis and to the return to democracy." Validity will be given to the announcement by mentioning, correctly, one of the headlines. Selection of the exact date will be determined by headline material which might stimulate anti-Nazi feeling.

1/12 25-252-

A freedom station purporting to be run by escaped leaders of the movement should be initiated. This radio might be called "Radio Hamburg". The station will specifically encourage Germans to participate in the movement. It will make suggestions for proselyting, and it will be continually fed by new voices -- supposedly newly escaped leaders of the movement.

1/16

Official radio will announce that it has received several additional sample documents. Among these will be several which were inscribed with initials, or code, or by means of pinpricks. One or more of the documents will include the following as part of the pledge: "When we have an opportunity to exact our revenge on the Nazis, we pledge that we will faithfully record their misdeeds."

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-4-

L40

Radio Hamburg will announce, with considerable concern, that groups of Nazis are signing Hamburger Bewegung pledges, in the hope of escaping punishment. This will be the excuse for Radio Hamburg to insist that each participant form a new nucleus with a different group of friends.

L43

Radio Hamburg will institute regular instructions in the methods of simple sabotage, and will, from time to time, receive letters outlining the misbehavior of minor Nazis.

L46

Official radio will carry a full report on the aims, aspirations, activities, and extension of the movement. Credibility will be increased by having an escaped participant insist that the movement began in Essen, rather than Hamburg. A prisoner of war could report that the movement had spread into the army.

L50 22-1221

MO, through rumor, black radio, and other media, will continue to expand and exploit the movement. Official radio will report its activities.

Specific plans will be developed to fit the situation which obtains after 1/30.

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APPENDIX VII

## Post-Invasion Uses of the Movement

The stated aims of the Project are all directed toward affecting the collapse of the Nazi party and the German war effort. However, if the movement sweeps Germany and Germany does capitulate, the movement could be used to advantage by the forces of occupation.

It is anticipated that military governors will try to make use of local administration personnel as much as possible. Members of the movement, after suitable interrogation and cross-checking, could be installed in various civilian administrative positions. Undoubtedly some persons will execute pre-dated or forged documents, but in most cases interrogation and internal checks within the movement will reveal falsehoods. In any event, individuals with apparently valid documents may be presumed to constitute a better personnel reservoir than an indifferentiated sample of the German population.

One of the activities of the movement, prior to occupation, is to record Nazi misdeeds. These records may or may not be used as a part of the indictments of Nazi criminals. In any case, the records would be valuable as a source of information regarding persons the Allies were contemplating placing or tolerating in positions of authority.

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## APPENDIX VIII

Specific Objections and Comments

Various objections could be raised to the project. Some of these objections, and comments regarding them, follow:

Objections: Self-respecting Germans may not desire preferential treatment as against the mass of their fellow countrymen.

Comment: It is the intention of this project to create the impression that the movement does or will embrace most (or all) self-respecting Germans, and that one of its purposes is to distinguish them from the smaller number who deserve punishment. The movement, therefore, should appeal to a self-respecting German as a means of establishing the fact that the majority of Germans are decent. In open propaganda, and perhaps to a considerable extent in black propaganda, it may be wise to play down the idea that the document is an individual "escape clause". Emphasis should probably be placed on the movement as a spontaneous uprising against Nazi domination. The escape clause interpretation can be left to those who wish to make it.

Objections: Considerable personal risk is involved in signing a document.

Comment: The personal risk involved in signing and hiding a document is less than the risk involved in almost any other

SECRET 2.

anti-Nazi activity. Listening to forbidden broadcasts or engaging in other more overt acts is certainly more dangerous.

The document, with newspaper heading, dateline, and written material, need not be larger than 6" by 8". It can easily be hidden.

Completion of the document is the initial step. It is anticipated that this step, because of its symbolic value and the implication that the participant is a part of a great opposition movement, will be followed by much more overt activities.

Without such an easy preliminary step, it is almost wishful thinking to hope that a passive German can be initiated directly to concrete opposition acts.

Objection: The Target Group may not fear reprisals sufficiently to feel impelled to join the movement.

Comment: Germans may not fear personal reprisals by the Anglo-Americans, but intelligence materials indicate clearly a widespread fear of vengeance by Poles, Russians, and citizens of other occupied countries. The origin of this movement would not be linked with any outside government or people. It would be represented as a spontaneous German way of demonstrating anti-Nazi feeling to any occupation force, regardless of nationality, which enters Germany.

Objection: Suppose that many Germans have neither fears of

SECRET 3.

reversals nor fears for their own personal safety. Suppose they are maintaining their part of the war effort primarily because they fear the economic results of defeat, unemployment, and inflation. Why would they participate in the movement?

Comment: There are always preferred social groups who avoid the hardships of general economic disaster. Members of the Target Group would, in many cases, look to their own self-interest and hope that their anticipated preferential treatment would help them to secure membership in a social group which would not suffer excessive hardships.

Objection: The execution of the document is a ritualistic act which might be objected to by sophisticated Germans.

Comment: The execution of this document is a formulation, on paper, of sentiments and intentions which are presumably agreed to prior to the signing of the document. This act merely creates tangible evidence of the agreement. It is a meaningful act, because it symbolizes the hopes of unhappy and frustrated Germans. Germans, as a rule, are not averse to a moderate amount of formalization. An example of this is the customary linking of arms and drinking of Bruderschaft when it is decided that two persons shall use familiar speech forms thereafter.

Objection: Some Germans might hide away old copies of newspapers in the anticipation that some day they might want to consult and pre-date a document.

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4.

Comment: It is anticipated that this would be done by some Germans. This act, in itself, would focus attention on the possibility of defeat, and would therefore have a deleterious effect on morale.

The German who took the trouble to hide a newspaper would, presumably, look forward to the time when he might want to find co-signers. If he expected to present the document at some time he would have to be sure that his future co-signers would hold to their story that the document was executed on the date indicated by the newspaper. Maybe his potential co-signers would already have signed legitimate documents, and would refuse to prejudice themselves by signing a pre-dated document. All of this involves risks and worries which might seem to be as great as those involved in proper execution of the document. After thinking the whole matter through, many Germans would execute a legitimate document or give up the idea entirely.

Objection: What harm to the Anglo-American war effort would result from the failure of the Project?

Comment: The Project does not compromise high policy. It does not risk the reputation of official radio, since the latter will attribute its sources to neutral outlets and escaped participants. No special personnel is required, nor are special funds or special material required. There would seem to be no reason for the Germans to use the Project for counter-propaganda. Any mention of an anti-Nazi movement by them, even if it were

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attributed to Anglo-American influences, would advertise the  
movement and would therefore be contrary to their interests.  
In short: the Project costs nothing; risks nothing.



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

April 2, 1943

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel William J. Donovan  
From: Captain H. S. Hughes

GERMANY'S ECONOMIC POSITION

The past month has witnessed a continuation of the previously noted general deterioration of the German Economic Position. The chief factors in this change have been: (1) Manpower shortage; (2) Transition from Blitz warfare to attritional warfare.

A. MANPOWER. An evaluation of the seriousness of Germany's military manpower shortage turns largely on an estimate of German casualties. The OSS preliminary estimate of permanent losses in the German Army from September 1939 through January 1943 is 3.8 million, substantially below the British estimate and substantially above the O-2 estimate. The OSS estimate is derived largely from obituaries in the German press, using accepted sampling methods. It is the only method which rests on objectively measurable data.

On the basis of this estimate, some 11 million men have been absorbed into the German armed forces out of 19 million men 45 or under (including physically unfit). Going to (1) low birth rate in 1914-18, (2) heavy withdrawal of young men for military services, and (3) concentration of casualties among younger age groups, casualties during 1942, in excess of the numbers covered by the new incoming classes, have been replaced largely by men in their middle thirties or older. Replacements of heavy 1943 casualties would necessitate further drafts on men of inferior fighting quality and would bring Germany closer to her limits of military manpower reserves.

SECRET

- 2 -

B. Armament Production. Manpower limitations have halted the previous expansion, and armament production remained about stable in 1942.

	End 1942	1943
Planes	1300 monthly	no change
Tanks	1500 monthly	slight decline

Up to the present, the effect of area bombing of German cities has been slight.

C. Transport. The Axis transport position declined seriously in 1942, with the result that materials were reallocated to effect a greater locomotive production, maintenance of railroads, etc. By mid-1943 the railroad position should be restored.

A serious shortage of trucks will remain. Since all civilian trucks suitable for military use have already been requisitioned, the excess of wastage over new production has produced a substantial decline in the number of serviceable military motor transport vehicles.

D. Civilian Living Standards. Such economic deterioration as Germany has experienced has taken place largely in civilian living standards -- but in clothes, housing, etc., rather than food. It has not yet seriously impaired the immediate productive efficiency of German workers.

#### E. Future Trends.

(1) Continued heavy capital expenditures for the European transport system, for the exploitation of mineral and agricultural resources, and for new synthetic plants;

(2) Although economic deterioration has to date been confined largely to civilian standards, casualties in 1943 on a scale comparable to 1942 would result in a significant decline in 1943, even in armament production. Direct military production in 1944 would still be sufficient, however, to support a substantial, though reduced, scale of ground force operations.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

April 2, 1943

**MEMORANDUM**

To: Colonel William J. Donovan  
From: Ensign John E. Sawyer

	<u>SHIPPING</u> (In gross Registered Tons)			
	<u>1942</u>		<u>1943</u>	
	Total Sunk	Total Construction	Total Sunk	Total Construction
Jan.	445,000	225,000	234,000	766,000
Feb.	649,000	257,000	340,000	1,600,000 (conservative
Mar.	799,000	314,000	634,000*	estimate for Feb. and
				March)
	1,893,000	796,000	1,237,000	2,366,000

First 3 months of 1942  
Net deficit: 1,097,000

First 3 months 1943  
Net gain: 1,129,000

\*This figure may rise to 700,000 when late reports come in.

11.1.50  
12/1/50  
12/1/50

COMBINED BRITISH AND AMERICAN  
ESTIMATE OF GERMAN ARMY STRENGTH

<u>Identified</u> <u>Divisions</u>		<u>Estimate of</u> <u>Divisional</u> <u>Strength</u>
24	Panzer	24
6	S.S. Panzer	6
7	Motorized Panzer	9
1	Goering Panzer	1
40	Panzer Divisions	40
18	Light and Mountain	18
119	Infantry Offensive	144
52	Infantry Defensive	56
2	Foreign Defensive	3
<u>Luftwaffe Divisions</u>		
1	Offensive (Bruch)	1
2	Defensive	5
232	Combat Divisions	267
42	Adm. Divisions	42
274	Total	312

In estimating establishment strength, it is still the agreed British and American practice to multiply the combat Divisions by 27,000. This gives a total establishment strength at present of 7,209,000.

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: February 9, 1943

FROM: E. S. Mason

SUBJECT: GERMAN MANPOWER SITUATION

1. German labor force, May 1939 - 39,000,000.
2. Reichswehr Arbeitsdienst conscripts, May 1939 - 2,100,000.

<u>Present Size of Military Forces</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>British</u>
3. Army	7,500,000	6,200,000
4. Navy	375,000	236,000
5. Air Force	1,960,000	2,200,000
6. Semi-Military	<u>1,400,000</u>	<u>1,000,000</u>
7. Total Military Strength	11,235,000	9,636,000
8. Total permanent casualties	1,800,000	4,000,000
9. Total	13,135,000	13,636,000
10. Subtract strength of May 1939 (see line 2)	2,100,000	2,100,000
11. Total military withdrawals from the labor force	11,000,000	11,500,000

Present Size of Labor Force

12. Male employment, May 1939, minus 500,000 foreigners equals 24,000,000 males.  
Subtract 11,000,000 military withdrawals (see line 11) equals 13,000,000.

-2-

13. Add natural growth in male working population - 250,000.
14. Add internal recruitment - 300,000.
15. Add employment of military casualties - 900,000.
16. Total present German male employment - 14,500,000.
17. German female employment, May 1939 - 14,500,000.
18. Add natural growth of female working population - 100,000.
19. Add internal recruitment - 900,000.
20. Total present German female employment - 15,500,000.
21. Foreign civilian employees - 3,000,000.
22. Employment of foreign prisoners of war - 2,000,000.
23. Total gainfully employed - 35,000,000 (add lines 16, 20, 21 and 22).

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Brig. General William J. Donovan      DATE: April 9, 1943  
FROM: Richard Hartsborne  
SUBJECT: R & A Report on Spain (German Transportation Problems in the Event of an Invasion of Spain, September 22, 1942.)

The report on German transportation problems showed that, by rail, a total of slightly over 15 divisions could arrive in Spain in the first two weeks after the opening of a campaign, and that 45 divisions could be sent in in 28 days. These figures do not include interruptions to traffic from land based aircraft in England and in Africa. They also assume that the Germans could reach the important ports of Barcelona, Valencia, and Alicante and begin to supply troops through them by the fourth week of operations.

The supply problem would constitute the principal limitation on the German commitment. 15,000 tons of supply per day could be transported by rail from the border to the major bases of Santander, Valladolid, Avila, and Cordoba. Such supplies would suffice to support 26 divisions in heavy fighting. The report concludes that, by the 21st day, the railroad system would be able to carry

SECRET

- 2 -

little more than three days' supply for the thirty divisions already in the area. At this point therefore troop movements by rail must necessarily be reduced in order to allow an increased flow of supplies. The ultimate daily tonnage of supplies could be raised by the use of trucks and ships to about 42,000, but this increase would involve major inroads on Germany's already weakened truck position.



## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

CONFIDENTIAL

## INTEROFFICE MEMO


TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

DATE: March 16, 1943

FROM: William L. Langer

SUBJECT: Factions in the Nazi Party and Their Potential Importance

Attached is a copy of the notes on a talk given before the Psychological Warfare Planning Committee today. These have been prepared by Dr. Walter L. Dorn, Chief, Central European Section, Europe-Africa Division, Branch of Research and Analysis.

  
William L. Langer  
Director, Branch of  
Research and Analysis

Attachment

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

Factions  
in Nazi Party

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

DATE: March 17, 1943

FROM: Walter L. Dorn

WLD

SUBJECT: Factions in the Nazi Party and Their Potential Importance.

Attached please find a copy of my remarks made before the members of the Planning Board on February 16, 1943.

**CONFIDENTIAL****FRACTIONS IN THE NAZI PARTY AND THEIR POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE**

Today Nazi domestic propaganda is confronted with the crucial problem of reconciling the broad German masses with the rapid growth of monopoly and concentration of German industry, a process begun in the early months of 1941 and scheduled to be completed on March 15 of this year. In connection with this problem the whole matter of the existence of factions within the Nazi Party once more becomes interesting and important. It will become more important still as the strain of the war on German society reaches its maximum.

I. **Background.** The failure of the 1941 German campaign against Russia opened the prospect of a long war. Nazi leadership resolved to comb-out and reorganize German war industry and the state civil service. The measures adopted in the early months of 1942 continued throughout the year and the process was to be completed, if the schedule is maintained, on March 15, 1943. This reorganization of industry and state was quite the most important thing that happened in Germany in 1942, unless it be Hitler's quarrel with the high command. I am less interested here in discussing these measures in detail than in an effort to indicate their cumulative effect. The process began with the appointment of Albert Speer as Minister of Armaments and Munitions and the complete overhauling of that ministry. I shall merely mention the measures which followed in quick succession. The first was a thorough reorganization of German war industry and the appointment of a whole network of committees of experts which henceforth dominate German war industry. Then came the cutting out of the less efficient war industries, and a drastic program of industrial concentration. There followed what has been called the Kontingentsystem, that is, the creation of a number of national

peak cartels, the so-called Reichswerke, for iron and steel, coal, textiles, etc. In a somewhat modified form this system was introduced throughout the entire German war economy, eliminating a very large number of small business enterprises. Simultaneously, there came a radical reduction and cutting out of the German civil service, a very considerable contraction of bureaucratic controls over industry, the wholesale transfer of state functions to the peak cartels and big business, and also an almost equally wholesale re-privatization of state-owned business enterprises. The upshot was that the Wehrmacht lost much of its control over German war economy, and that big business acquired greater independence than it ever enjoyed under the Nazi regime. Finally, under the impression of the Stalingrad disaster, there came the most drastic decree of them all at the end of January, 1943, the total mobilization of German labor, and the closing down of every shop or industry not immediately essential to the war effort.

All these measures, the concentration of industry, the reduction of the civil service, the total mobilization of German labor, affected the middle classes more than they did labor or big business. Precious little of these middle classes now remains. The entire tendency since the beginning of 1942 has been to strengthen big industry, to weaken the civil service, to strengthen the Nazi Party's hold on the mechanism of the state, and to undermine the traditional position of the middle classes in German society.

**II. Factions.** Are there factions? One may quarrel over the word. Three, usually, are mentioned: 1. Goebbels and the radical left wing; 2. Goering and the industrialists; 3. Himmler and the SS. The Wehrmacht must be considered apart from these.

**1. Goebbels and National Socialism.** Goebbels, as Propaganda Chief and

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-3-

Gauleiter of Berlin, it is reported from a good source, has definitely gone over to a Left National Bolshevik course. Goebbels once was a National Bolshevik in the days of Gregor Strasser, and now he is reported as being supported by Ley and many other prominent Party officials. What is the truth of the matter? Certainly, Goebbels was once identified with leftist tendencies, and there is little doubt that in his recent speeches, notably that of February 18, 1943, he wished to awaken the impression that he was in favor of radical Bolshevik measures. But Goebbels is not represented on a single important council that determines economic policy; compared with Goebbels, Goering, Hitler, Himmler even, he has little demonstrable influence. Moreover, Goebbels is Propaganda Chief; he is a demagogue who will say anything which the particular situation requires. If any of the leading Nazis is a pure cynic, it is he. Again, if he is in fact pursuing a leftist course, there is no evidence of a single genuinely socialist measure which he or any left wing Nazi has sponsored. The tendency has been all the other way. It is our considered opinion that under the stress of the war, the administrative mechanism of the German civil service has been so depleted and weakened that a serious nationalization of the means of production is for the moment out of the question. There is, therefore, much to be said in favor of the position that Goebbels is a pure demagogue. I should not like to identify myself altogether with this position, for even if Goebbels is guardedly talking of socialism and of the extinction of the middle classes, a situation might well arise where he is caught in his own logic. But for the present he has no real influence. Nor is there an organized Goebbels faction that we know of.

2. Summary. In view of the legislation referred to above, it should be apparent that Goering and his friends of the Four Year Plan, the big indus-

-4-

trialists, are actually in the saddle. Germany cannot continue the war without them. Recent legislation has given them a position of power such as they never before possessed under Hitler. They are represented on Speer's advisory board, they allocate their own orders and their own raw materials - although their taxes are high and their profits small. The higher civil service supports them, as does the Wehrmacht - at least that part of it which is represented by General George Thomas and his economic officers. If the word faction can be used in connection with any of the groups mentioned here, it may be applied to the Goering group - so at least the legislation of the past year would seem to indicate.

3. Himmler and the SS. The SS can scarcely be said to constitute a faction in the sense in which we are using the term here. The SS are the core of the police system, they provide State and Party with an intelligence service - and there is the Waffen-SS. It is only the so-called General SS that is of interest to us here. This is a carefully selected order, based on the notion of a racial aristocracy. Taking the General SS - apart from the police system, the Gestapo, and the SS-Combat Divisions - it is not an extremely numerous body, perhaps no more than 250,000. It is generally known that the higher ranks of the General SS are represented in all the important ministries with the single exception of the War Ministry, which is composed of old army officers. Not so well known is the fact that the General SS is almost equally well represented among the great industrial leaders of the country. German industry is honeycombed with SS men. There is no radical difference in the political and social position of Goering's industrialists and Himmler's SS men, and it is dangerous to magnify the reputed deadly quarrel between these two men. It should not be forgotten that every member of the SS commits

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himself on entering the order to the principle of the sanctity of private property, and that compulsory saving is enjoined on every member of the General SS. The time when Das Schwarze Korps enjoyed baiting big business leaders is past. What is called the radical Socialist line of the SS is nothing more than the application of military discipline to social and industrial affairs.

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: General Donovan  
From: Dr. Walter G. Langer  
Subject:

Date: June 8, 1945

Attached is a Memorandum prepared by me in response to the R.A. A Memorandum of May 17, 1945 on the Nazi Defeat in Tunisia. Since a copy of the original Memorandum was sent to you I thought you might be interested in my comments and suggestions which are based wholly on a psychological evaluation of the situation.

Walter G. Langer  
Consultant



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## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Dr. William L. Langer  
 From: Dr. Walter S. Langer  
 Subject: Comments on E & A Memorandum of May 27, 1943 entitled: THE EFFECTS OF THE GERMAN BOMBING OF BRITAIN ON THE MORALE OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE AND THE U.S. ARMY

Date: June 2, 1943

THE EFFECTS OF THE GERMAN BOMBING OF BRITAIN ON THE MORALE OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE AND THE U.S. ARMY

For purposes of Psychological Warfare against Germany I would suggest that the recent defeat in Tunisia be treated from three distinct points of view: (a) the effect on the German Home Front; (b) the effect on the German Military; and (c) its effect on allied and occupied countries.

(a) From a purely psychological point of view I would guess that the defeat in Tunisia constituted the severest blow dealt to German Home Fronts in the course of the entire war. This is not due solely to the magnitude of the defeat. The German Propaganda Ministry admitted that might be construed as a grave psychological error in its domestic propaganda. In my memorandum of February 27, 1943 on THE EFFECTS OF THE GERMAN BOMBING OF BRITAIN I pointed out that the new German strategy consisted of exaggerating the power of the Germans while minimizing the strength of the British and Americans. The theme, briefly, ran as follows: It is Germany's great mission to turn back the British hordes and save Western Civilization from utter destruction. They are descending upon us and it is no longer a question of whether you are in favor of the war or not. It is now a question of saving your home, your families and your skins from complete annihilation. Furthermore, Germany must fulfill this sacred task single-handed. The British democracies are too stupid to see the danger which threatens them and too weak to do anything about it even if they did. In order to strengthen this appeal the propaganda was created that the British and Americans together were unable to defeat even a small fragment of the German Army in North Africa. Under these circumstances, how could anyone expect them to do anything against the entire German Army? The temporary setbacks on the Russian Front during the winter and early spring seemed to corroborate these claims.

This strategy was extremely successful as far as the Germans were concerned. It had a strong positive side which the Germans always like and a strong negative side which is even more important in a defensive action. The result was

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that morale at home was strengthened while resistance at the Front stiffened. The violent fighting during the winter in the face of repeated defeats, broken promises and untold hardships bears testimony to the success of this campaign.

Their error lay in the fact that the campaigning was too one-sided. In focalizing all the hopes and fears of the German people on the Russians they had failed to take precautions against other eventualities. Even worse, in order to accomplish their immediate purpose they had greatly minimized the potential strength of the Russian Allies. In consequence the German people were almost wholly unprepared for the Russian disaster. The jolt was even greater since what had been described to them as a relatively small force of Germans turned out to be a fairly sizeable army. Furthermore, the unprecedented rapidity of the collapse of a front which they believed was being successfully defended must have been a severe shock to German pride.

One could argue that this was not an error on the part of the German Propaganda Ministry since their campaign had served the immediate purpose of raising production and slowing down the Russian advance. Only a German fully acquainted with all the circumstances could be in a position to give a valid judgment on this point. In general, however, a relatively low level of morale which does not fluctuate very much with victories or defeats is more desirable, in the long run, than an artificially created high morale which is vulnerable to unexpected developments. From this point of view the German psychological strategy must be judged as faulty.

It would be most unwise, however, to assume that in consequence of this jolt German home morale is approaching the breaking point. A trapped animal is not disconcerted quite so easily and from a psychological point of view I would guess that the Germans are beginning to realize more and more that they are trapped and that they must abandon their grandiose ideas of the distant future and begin to take account of their immediate present and the consequences of their actions. They are probably poorly equipped for this transition. Ever, more than ever, their thinking becomes has been thrown off balance and demands a complete re-orientation. This is fertile ground for PL. Our PS should exploit our secondary psychological advantage to the full before the German Propaganda Ministry can devise and set into operation a new strategy to cope with the unexpected situation.

I am in entire agreement with the writer of your memorandum in believing that all abstract talk about world federations or vague promises for the future are utterly futile. I disagree with

**SECRET**

him, however, in believing that we can wean the German people away from their war effort by stories about how well we treat our prisoners or what we are doing for the inhabitants of countries occupied by our troops. Stories of this kind are important but the maximal effect will be gained if they seep into Germany and the Occupied Countries via underground channels and are not disseminated by us directly. Such a technique might possibly succeed with the Italians, the Balkans or even the French, but I do not believe that it would succeed with the Germans. To the Germans it would almost certainly appear as a downright attempt to bribe them with gratifications of the "flack" and this they would resent and reject. The Germans, as a whole, have a queer attachment to ideas, lefty ideals and things of the "hybrid" which it is difficult for the average American to understand. They take them far more seriously than we do and it is not unusual, in ordinary times, for large numbers of Germans to participate in various riots in defense of their respective political points of view. We also have from the last war, as well as this one, that the Germans have a tremendous capacity for material deprivations and sufferings which borders on the masochistic. They seem to get a certain pleasure out of the martyr role and this makes them rather impervious to appeals based on material gains.

In my opinion any direct appeal to them to actively oppose the regime or refuse to become partners in crime is premature. The first rule of successful PR, it seems to me, is to show your audience, through your appeals, suggestions, and treatment of topics, that you understand his psychological makeup and appreciate his position and the problems which confront him. To ask him, at this time, to actively oppose the regime or refuse to take part in its activities is synonymous with asking him to place his head on the guillotine or apply for a one-way ticket to a concentration camp. Under these circumstances, he will probably throw the baby out with the bath and nothing is accomplished. In fact, there is the danger of arousing ridicule in the mind of the listener, of building up resistance against any suggestions in the future, and of losing your audience entirely.

A much more successful line, it seems to me, is (1) to present our case in such a way that the conclusions we want him to adopt are almost inescapable but seem to come from within himself rather than from any one and (2) to present our views concerning the status of individuals in concrete terms which enable him to figure out for himself just where he stands. For example: We are always insisting that "all those responsible for atrocities and spoliation will be ruthlessly punished." This is far too vague to carry any conviction except in the case of a few outstanding individuals. It tells the ordinary German absolutely nothing about our attitude towards him or his crimes. The English Propaganda Ministry has not helped matters much. Some time ago they changed their policy

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SECRET

and maintained that every German was responsible and that all would be punished for their participation. This is hardly the type of approach one should adopt when trying to win adherents or persuade individuals to modify their present course. Goebbels has seen the fallacy of this line of attack and has used it as the foundation for his own propaganda with outstanding success over a considerable period of time. Our first step should be to break this circle by stating in unequivocal terms that we differentiate sharply between the ardent participants and those who reluctantly take part under duress.

Although this is a necessary first step it is not enough to carry conviction. In order to do this we should set up a concrete scale of punishments which will enable every individual to calculate for himself what his degree of involvement is and what his future punishment will be. For example, a plan along the following lines might be worked out. Each individual in Germany would, at the conclusion of the war, be fined a sum of money equal to the contributions he has made to the Nazi Party since its inception. This money would be placed in a fund to be used for the reconstruction of Europe. Since the Nazi-Race would have contributed a minimum amount to the Party their fines would be correspondingly small, while the enthusiastic supporters, the Party members who gained most from the regime, probably contributed heavily and will consequently be fined heavily. The same would apply to the big industrialists and others who made the rise of the Party possible.

Then, too, we might devise a scale based on party rank on the theory that the higher an individual rose in the party the more responsible he was for the crimes committed. An ordinary Party Member might be sentenced to one day in a Reconstruction Labor Battalion for each week he was an active member; a member of the SA two days for each week he served in this organization; an SS man three days for each week he served, and so on up the scale. Leaders and all the higher-ups should be tried individually and sentenced according to their personal guilt and responsibilities for atrocities committed. We might carry this sort of thing even further by devising a scale of deductions. If the individual at any time actively opposed the rise or tried to expose the practices of the Nazis, a certain percentage of his total punishment would be deducted; if he protected or helped Jews escape from the Nazis this would also reduce his total punishment; or if he could offer proof that he had helped a foreign laborer to escape from enforced labor, or had participated in sabotage, and so on, he could claim still further reductions.

In other words, each individual could calculate his degree of involvement and responsibility with considerable accuracy. It would not be a deterrent to deeper involvement and might even induce

-4-

SECRET

some individuals to participate in Anti-Nazi activities in order to reduce the punishment that will presumably be administered at the conclusion of the war. It is my conviction that some such concrete scheme will do more to make the individual German stop and think before he acts than all the abstract and vague promises that we could possibly give him. It singles him out as an individual apart from the group and places the responsibilities for his actions directly on his own shoulders.

(b) The efforts of the Tunisian collapse on the German Military, it seems to me, are somewhat different. They, too, were probably trapped to some extent, by their own propaganda, into underestimating the potential strength of the Allies. This factor, however, could not have been as strong with the Tunisian troops as it was on the Home Front inasmuch as they must have become increasingly aware of our power over a considerable period. Undoubtedly many psychological factors played a role in determining the rapidity of the change from a first-class fighting force to a captive army. I would like, however, to call attention to one factor which seems to me to be of the utmost importance for purposes of PW and which is rarely taken into consideration. This is the dual nature of the character structure which grows out of the German culture. I need not go into a detailed discussion concerning the origins of this dualism. It is sufficient at the moment to call attention to its existence and to describe some of its manifestations.

The duality is particularly noticeable in German men. Since by and large it seems safe to say that the character of most German men is an odd combination of two opposing tendencies: on the one side they are arrogant, aggressive, brutal and dominating, while on the other side they are gentle, submissive, passive and servile. It is true that these same tendencies exist in almost all people, but the Germans seem unable to achieve a satisfactory integration of the two into a single consistent pattern. Instead, both tendencies continue to exist independently of each other and the individual oscillates back and forth from one role to the other according to circumstances. Furthermore, on a conscious level they do not seem to sense any contradiction.

Any number of examples could be cited. At one moment, for instance, the traditional German officer is arrogant and brutal to those he rules while at the same moment he is utterly servile to anyone superior to himself. It is a "master-slave" complex in which the individual alternates between the two roles depending on circumstances. The important point is that they seem to enjoy both roles. The same duality is to be found in the Nazi creed of the present time as well as in their philosophy.

-4-

SECRET

Each individual is a "little Pushover" to those beneath him and almost a slave to those above him. And the lowliest Aryan is the unquestioned master of the Jew. The interesting part of it is that the Pushover himself is a victim of this duality. Even after he came to power he could not resist adopting a very servile demeanor when he came in contact with Hindenburg. The ruthless and brutal Goering has expressed the other side of his nature very clearly when he says of Hitler: "From the first moment that I saw and heard him I belonged to him body and soul, and to many of my comrades the same thing happened. I passionately pledged myself to his service and have followed him unswervingly."

It is my conviction that this duality lies at the very root of the German character and that we will never be able to understand them fully or deal with them adequately until we thoroughly understand the nature and origins of the conflict and its many ramifications in German life and conduct. That it is extremely widespread cannot be doubted. Not only do the Army and the Nazi Party bear testimony to the frequency of this duality among the men, but every early speech of Hitler plays directly upon it. By exploiting it in his behalf he was able to transform peaceful audiences into raging fanatics and gradually work his way to power. The formula was always the same: If you submit to me and accept me as your master without reservations then you, too, can conquer and dominate. Thus both tendencies were to be gratified through a single line of behavior and the conflict supposedly resolved.

To know from our work with individual patients that the resolution of the conflict by such means is more apparent than real. Everything appears to be quite satisfactory on the surface and the individual seems fairly contented with such an arrangement. It is, however, only temporary. When confronted by someone whom he respects more—either from the point of view of power or achievement or both—than the person to whom he has voluntarily submitted, then the conflict reasserts itself and he almost automatically abandons the one and assumes the passive, submissive role to the other.

I believe that it was this phenomenon on a large scale that took place on the Russian Front. As long as they were brutal to Hitler by this peculiar bond they were his willing slaves, even to the point of sacrificing their lives. Fighting was not so much a business with them as it was a manifestation of the submissive side of their nature which demands that the individual place himself in the position of complete subjection and blind obedience to a powerful master. When they are confronted by a situation in which

-7-

SECRET

it became obvious that their master is less powerful than another and is unable to protect them or carry out his promises, then they tend to abandon him and seek shelter in being submissive to the superior power.

One may ask why this phenomenon did not take place before Stalingrad last winter when a large segment of the German Army was caught in a pocket. One reason, I presume, is that the situation was not as clearly defined as in Tunisia. There was always a ray of hope that a German column might penetrate and relieve them and furthermore they were only a small part of a much larger army which was still powerful and intact. Moreover, as I pointed out in my memorandum of February 17th, it is much easier for the average German to recognize and admit that the English or Americans are superior to themselves than it would be to admit that the Russians are. Most Germans, from Hitler down, have a secret admiration and respect for England and America which is completely lacking in the case of Russia. A great deal of inner resistance would have to be overcome before the Germans as a whole, could assume a submissive role towards the Russians.

When we understand the nature and operation of this underlying conflict and its manifestations it becomes apparent that any direct appeal to the German people at the present time is futile. Even though on a rational level they might be convinced of its wisdom, they would find themselves more or less paralyzed when it came to action. As long as the people are in the grip of this unconscious and involuntary relationship to Hitler, there is little hope of undermining German morale through appeals or by stirring up frictions and fears in specific groups. These can be used as diversions, rationalizations and smoke screens for psychological warfare but, it seems to me, the chief attack must be directed at this underlying conflict of tendencies.

There are probably a great many ways of doing this. Emphasizing the German of our overwhelming superiority in every phase of warfare is undoubtedly the most effective. As soon as it becomes obvious to the German people that we are the more powerful and that their situation is hopeless, I would expect them to react in exactly the same manner as the German armies in Tunisia. If my hypothesis is correct and applies to even a majority of the German people, then the collapse in Germany and the military should be equally certain provided that we do the comparing and not the Russians. It is possible that continued Russian advances might delay the collapse rather than accelerate it.



-2-

SECRET

The weakness of the collapse in Tunisia should be a precedent for the German military which should stand us in good stead in the future. Perhaps this will prove to be the greatest value we derived from our victory. It must have been a severe shock to many ardent Nazis to find that even after ten years of training, they were still not immune from their underlying conflict and that when the time is propitious they cannot resist falling victim to its demands. The proof that this is still possible in such large numbers and with such rapidity must be a source of concern for the Nazis as well as for the military leaders. It will be interesting to see how they cope with the problem.

Psychological warfare can hasten this process and prepare the ground by playing upon this weakness in many of the German people. In my opinion it is one of the real sources of their fear which they strive to externalize through the mechanisms of projection and displacement. Nevertheless, they sense the weakness in themselves and they hate it, but in spite of their eternal efforts to combat it they unconsciously fear that they will eventually fall victims to it. We can increase this fear by some such program as that outlined under (a) of this Memorandum which strives to isolate the individual from the group and from his superiors and make him personally responsible for his actions and deeds. Under these circumstances, he is sure likely to question the leader's ability to protect him in adverse circumstances which will result in a state of greater readiness to assume a subjective attitude to our superior power. Along with this we should frame our communications in such a way that we continually build up the impression of our increasing superiority and the hopelessness of their own situation. This should not be done so much by blatantly stating production figures or by threats of what we are going to do when we get around to it, but more by implication and by our demeanor.

Now, too, we can hasten the process by cultivating the impression in the minds of the Germans that Hitler is not as strong or as powerful as he pretends to be. Reminding them of his many broken promises is only one way of doing this and perhaps not the most effective. The Germans are undoubtedly well aware of all these and we could not be talking them anything new. Much more effective, it seems to me, would be to refresh their memories of all the questions on which he has shown himself weak and tried to appear strong. For example, we could frame memorial programs for the anniversary of the Blood Purge of June 30th, 1934, a reminder of Hitler's conduct in the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923, etc. According to my estimation of the situation an internal collapse in Germany can only be brought about by displacing their present leader with one whom they consider even more powerful in every respect. This can be accomplished by gradually whittling away the power they have attributed to their present leader while, at the same time, building up an exaggerated conception of our own power.



-4-

**SECRET**

Many psychological tricks could be devised to further this plan. Chief among them is probably the element of fatigue. It is well known that the resistance of the individual is greatly reduced as fatigue increases. It might be advisable to have our bombing expeditions arrive in the neighborhood of as many German towns as possible after they have dropped their bomb loads. They would not need to fly directly over the cities and run the risk of anti-aircraft. It would be sufficient to fly close enough to cut off the air-raid alarms and disturb the sleep of the people by forcing them to go to the shelters. Repeated nights of broken sleep and the knowledge that our enemy aircraft are over Germany should contribute heavily to the achievement of our end.

Such a program, if it is sound, requires considerably time in which to develop since it depends upon a gradual wearing away of the bond which holds the German people in their present state. It would be well, therefore, to consider other means of obtaining the same end. The simplest way of doing this, from a purely psychological point of view, would be to remove Hitler. Although the Nazi set-up appears to be a hierarchy in which each individual is responsible to his immediate superior, I am of the conviction that it is Hitler who holds the whole structure together. The real continual bond is between Hitler and the people even though it may pass over other individuals. I am firmly convinced that no other individual in Germany could possibly replace him and that if Hitler were displaced of the whole structure would disintegrate very rapidly.

The immediate problem, under these circumstances, would be how to dispose of Hitler? Obviously, we are not in a position to do this directly and it is safe to assume that few people in Germany would have the opportunity, considering the precautions that are taken to guard his life. This leaves only the high military men who are in direct contact with him. With careful planning, however, it might be possible to induce one of them to undertake the assignment.

My plan would run along the following lines. It must be clear to the high military officials by this time that their chances of success are extremely small and that time is constantly running against them. It must also be clear to them that Hitler and his closest Nazi Party leaders are more interested in saving their own skins as long as possible than they are in preserving the reputation of German arms. It must be a foregone conclusion with them that with defeat these Nazi leaders will be executed and that consequently they will postpone the evil day as long as possible, regardless of what it may cost the German people or Germany itself. Furthermore,

-10-

SECRET

It must be clear to them that they have won their great victories of the war and that the chances of any individual improving on his reputation as a great military leader are extremely small. Under these circumstances and in view of the friction which has existed between the Party and the Army over a period of years, it does not seem too far-fetched to me to suppose that one of the high-ranking officers might take matters into his own hands. The amazing thing to me is that one of them has not already undertaken it.

Since they have not, it might be wise to try to help matters along. In order to do so we must ask ourselves what the ranking officers in the German Army want. It would probably be safe to assume that their chief concern at the moment is to save face and conserve the power of Germany for some future attempt at conquest. If this is true, we can suppose that they would be interested in making peace at the earliest possible moment on the most favorable terms, while at the same time they would like to be absolved of the responsibility for the entire undertaking and their subsequent actions.

Our psychological warfare should, then, use the German High Command along these lines and attempt to lure them into assassinating Hitler by creating the impression that he is the sole obstacle to achieving their ends. The campaign would converge from at least three directions:

- (1) It must be impressed upon them over and over again, from every point of vantage, that we will never consider making peace as long as Hitler is in power.
- (2) We should create the impression that we consider Hitler solely responsible for the actions of the German Army and regard it as a tool in his hands. The German Propaganda Ministry has tried to create this impression in the case of German victories. We should stretch it to cover the defeats in Russia, Egypt and Tunisia. In other words, we should make Hitler the scapegoat for the Army to hide behind. Hitler, and Hitler alone, should be made responsible for all Germany's ills at home as well as on the front. This would mean omitting any direct references to the responsibility we ascribe to specific subordinates.
- (3) We should create the impression that we might be willing to entertain a peace proposal from an orderly and responsible government, if such a one existed in Germany, without specifying just what we mean by those terms. We should also tap on our insinuations that Germany must be dominated, or at least not make them quite so voluntary.

-13-

SECRET

If such a program were followed for a period of time, I can imagine that a high-ranking officer might feel called upon to remove Hitler for the welfare of Germany as well as for the power and position he, himself, might hope to gain.

We might even help the plan along by putting the idea into their heads. Just now, after the Russian collapse, would seem to me to be a good time to plant a rumor to the effect that this episode had caused a great deal of discussion between Hitler, who had planned the defense of North Africa, and his military staff which resulted in an unsuccessful attempt upon Hitler's life. If conditions in Germany are anything like those that I have outlined, it should be fertile ground for the spreading of such a rumor.

In the event that such a plan were successful, I would guess that Germany would be far more vulnerable. No other Nazi could possibly replace Hitler in his relationship to the German people since none would be accepted in gaining the power would, of necessity, be an inferior of Hitler's. Furthermore, there is no indication that any of the leading Nazis have the personal appeal to any large part of the German population that Hitler has enjoyed. The result, if a lead were successful in gaining the power, could be the disintegration of the Party due to the frictions and jealousies which have been accumulating for years. The present 'master-slave' relationship would be broken and the morale of the people would deteriorate very rapidly.

It seems to me more likely to suppose that in the event of Hitler's death the Army would prevent future government control by the Nazis and set up a sham government of their own which would establish some appearance of order and responsibility. They would probably fight on for a reasonable period of time to save face and then instruct the government to make peace overtures, probably in the hope that in dealing with us we would help ward off the menacing Russian before Germany was overrun by them. Such overtures we could reject on the grounds that the existing government was unacceptable to us. Nevertheless, we would have achieved an outstanding victory in psychological warfare which would establish our unquestioned superiority. It is my firm conviction that under such circumstances the Germans would not fight on for any length of time and that an unconditional surrender would follow very shortly. The plan is daring, but in my opinion it is worth the gamble.

(c) The effects of the Russian collapse on the Occupied and satellite countries would have to be treated individually and do not fall within the scope of this Memorandum.

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